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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This matter involves a employment action by Mark Van ("Van") for damages resulting from his 
wrongful termination as Director of Maintenance ofthe Life-Flight Program ofPortneufMedical Center 
("PMC") ("hospital") on April 20, 2005. The District Court initially granted Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. Van appealed the district 
court's decision. The Supreme Court ofIdaho vacated and remanded the district court's decision with 
regard to the Whistleblower Act claim. 
A jury trial was then held on Van's Whistleblower Act Claim. The trial commenced January 18, 
2011, and ended on February 24,2011. The jury ultimately found for Defendant and the district court 
awarded fees and costs to Defendant. Plaintiff Mark Van appeals from the district court's Judgment 
entered March 17,2011, and from the Memorandum Decision and Order entered June 29, 2011. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Van's whistleblower claims were filed on October 17,2005. ROA Report, p. 1. After a summary 
judgment decision and subsequent appeal to this Court, this Court entered a decision on July 7, 2009, 
remanding Plaintiff's Whistleblower claims back to the district court for further proceedings. The 
district court then scheduled the matter for a first trial setting on October 19, 2010 and a second trial 
setting on January 13,2011. ROA Report, p.11. On August 2,2010, the district court entered a Minute 
Entry & Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to file his Amended Complaint with the condition that any 
reference to "Air 21" be redacted from the pleading. R. Vol. I, p. 43. 
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Plaintiff filed another Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on August 24,2010. R. Vol. 
I, p. 46. On August 27, 2010, the district court entered a Minute Entry & Order denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Inclusion ofIndi vidually Named Defendants. The court also acknowledged that the parties 
had stipulated to vacating the October trial date and making the January 2011 trial date a firm date. The 
district court then set the trial to begin on January 18, 2011. R. Vol. I, pp. 80-81. 
On September 14, Defendant filed its Answer to Amended Complaint. R. Vol. I, p. 88. On 
November 8, 2010, the district court entered, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, an Order Dismissing 
Judgment entered January 15,2008. R. Vol. I, p. 131. The parties' stipulation was based upon this 
Court's July 7, 2009 decision that the "district court's award ofattomey fees and costs [116,983.60] 
is vacated." R. Vol. I, p. 130. 
On December 2,2010, the district court entered a Minute Entry & Order, granting in part Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel and Second Motion to Compel. R. Vol. I, pp. 148-149. On December 8, the district 
court issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel in regard to Request for Production No. 
12. R. Vol. I, pp. 151-155. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Re 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel on December 22, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 162. On December 23, 2010, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Continue Trial and Motion to Expedite. R. Vol. I, p. 183. 
On January 13,2011, a Hearing was held on a number of pre-trial motions, including Plaintiff's 
Motion to Continue Trial. R. Vol I, pp. 203-206. The court's decision, in part, denied Defendant's 
Motion in Limine, which pertained to evidence of previous disciplinary actions regarding pilots, former 
pilots, and Pam Holmes; evidence of the 1993 helicopter hard landing; evidence of the terms and 
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conditions of any severance agreements that PMC entered into with former employees, and testimony 
from Plaintiff's expert Michael Stevens. R. Vol I, p. 204. 
The court took judicial notice that a separate action had been filed and was tried before an OSHA 
administrative law judge. The court further ruled that both parties could publish transcripts from the 
administrative law proceeding for purposes of eliciting testimony from unavailable witnesses and 
impeaching the testimony of witnesses. The court denied Plaintiff's motion to continue, finding that 
all discovery issues had been ruled on and that waiting for the administrative law judge's decision in 
the OSHA case was not a sufficient reason to delay the trial in state court. R. Vol I, pp. 204-205. 
Trial began on January 18, 2011. Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff's proposed jury instructions 
and trial exhibits. The court denied Defendant's motions. R. Vol III, p. 519. Three days of Voir Dire 
were held and the parties presented their opening statements on January 20,2011. R. Vol III, p. 520. 
Trial resumed on January 25,2011 and continued through January 28,2011. R. Vol. III, pp. 520-
523. On January 28, 2011, Defendant moved to exclude testimony of Plaintiff's expert Michael 
Stevens as to the issue of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Mr. Stevens then testified as to his 
qualifications and the court directed counsel to brief the issue of remuneration under Idaho 
Whistleblower Act, and prohibited Mr. Stevens from testifYing until further argument was heard on the 
matter. R. Vol. III, p. 522. 
Trial resumed on February 1,2011 and continued through February 4,2011. R. Vol. III, pp. 523-
525. On February 1,2011, Plaintiff submitted his Memorandum on Pain and Suffering Awards under 
the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act and Defendant submitted its Brief Concerning Idaho 
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Code Sections 6-2105 and 6-2106. R. Vol. III, pp. 317, 337. On the same date, the court reviewed the 
issue of compensatory damages outside the presence ofthe jury. R. Vol. III, pp. 523-524. Upon hearing 
argument from counsel, the court ruled that Michael Stevens would not be allowed to testifY as to any 
alleged pain and suffering endured by Van. Plaintiff was then given the option as to whether or not to 
call Stevens as his expert witness subject to objection from Defendant. R. Vol. III, p. 524. 
On February 2, 2011, counsel stipulated outside ofthe presence ofthe jury to the use of transcripts 
from the OSHA matter in further questioning subject to referencing the investigator's transcripts as 
"recorded third-party interview." R. Vol. III, p. 524. 
On the morning of February 3, 2011, outside the presence of the jury, Defendant's counsel 
represented to the court that a decision was issued on Plaintiffs separate AIR 21 matter. After 
discussion, the Court ordered that counsel and all parties were prohibited from disseminating any 
information from the AIR 21 case to any media outlet and that witnesses were prohibited from 
commenting or making statements in regard to that decision. R. Vol. III, p. 524. 
Trial resumed February 8, 2011 and continued through February 10,2011. R. Vol. III, pp. 526-526. 
Trial then resumed on February 15, 2011 and continued through February 18, 2011. R. Vol. III., pp. 
526-528. On February 16, Plaintiff rested his case. With the jury excused for the day, Defendant 
moved for a directed verdict pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(a). The court heard argument by counsel and 
Defendant submitted a brief requesting dismissal of the action. The court then allowed Plaintiff to 
provide a responsive brief and took Defendant's motion under advisement. R. Vol. III, p. 527. 
On February 17, the court addressed Defendant's motion for a directed verdict outside the presence 
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of the jury. R. Vol. III, p. 527. The court denied Defendant's motion on the basis that Plaintiff had 
produced substantial evidence required under L R.C.P. 50(a). On February 18, Defendant rested its 
case. R. Vol. III, p. 528. 
Trial resumed on February 23 and continued through February 24. R. Vol. III, pp. 528-529. On 
February 23, Plaintiff called rebuttal witnesses, exhibits were admitted, and the court held a jury 
instruction conference with counsel. The jury reconvened and the court read final instructions. The 
jurors were excused to deliberate. R. Vol. III, p. 528. On February 24, 2011, the court received 
notification that the Jury had reached a verdict. The verdict was read in open court. Defendant 
requested that the jury be polled. Upon confirming eachjuror's decision, the court ordered the verdict 
entered and recorded and the jury was excused. R. Vol. III, p. 529. The jury entered a verdict for 
Defendant. R. Vol. III, pp. 531-532. 
Defendant filed its Memorandum of Costs and Fees on March 30, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 345. Plaintiff 
filed his Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs on April 13,2011. R. Vol. III, p. 497. The court entered 
its Minute Entry & Order regarding trial on April 5, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 519. 
Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on April 27, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 533. On May 16,2012, a 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal was filed, and on the same day, Defendant filed its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs. R. Vol III, pp. 541,543. On May 23, 
2011, the court heard argument on Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees and entered a Minute 
Entry & Order on May 27, taking the matter under advisement. R. Vol. III, p. 551. 
On June 29, 2011, the court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order onattomey fees. R. Vol. 
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III, p. 553. The court awarded $12,063.72 in costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs for expert 
witness fees in the amount of $4,603.92, and $38,192.82 incurred in the appeal of the initial action. 
R. Vol. III, pp. 559,563 and 568. The court enteredjudgment in favor of Defendant in the amount of 
$54,860.46 on June 29, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 570. 
Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 8, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 572. An Amended 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal was entered on July 18, 2011. R. Vol. III, p. 583. Plaintiff filed his 
Motion for Stay of Execution and Enforcement of Judgment and Waiver of Posting Cash/Bond on July 
28,2011. Defendant filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal on August 9,2011. R. Vol. III, p. 587. 
On August 11,2011, the court entered an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Execution 
and Enforcement of Judgment and Waiver of Posting CashIBond R. Vol. III, p. 591. On August 24, 
Plaintifffiled aMotion for Reconsideration of the court's August 11,2011 Order, and the court denied 
the motion in its Minute Entry & Order, entered January 20, 2012. R. Vol. III, pp. 593, 604. 
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal on June 18,2012. R. Vol. III, p. 606. A Second 
Amended Clerk's Certificate of Appeal was filed July 18,2012. R. Vol. III, p. 620. Defendant filed a 
Request for Additional Transcript and Record on July 3, 2012. R. Vol III, p. 622. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Van's Testimony Regarding His Employment Claims 
1. Van's Employment with the Hospital 
Mark Van became Director of Maintenance for the LifeFlight Program of Bannock Regional 
Medical Center, under the hospital's 135 certificate, in 1986. The 135 certificate allows the hospital 
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to carry passengers for hire in a helicopter. Tr. pp. 107, II. 17-25; pp. 108, II. 9-141• Van's job duties 
included all facets of he licopter maintenance. Tr. p. 108, II. 17-25. Van'sjob description required that 
Van "[f]ollow established OSHA guidelines for universal precautions and continuously in a safe 
manner without causing alann to self or others." Tr. p. 111,11.23-25, p. 112, II. 1-17. 
Every year, Portneuf employees had to attend a class on following OSHA guidelines. An OSHA 
poster was placed next to the classroom in the auditorium that said that "You have a right to a safe and 
healthful workplace. It's the law". Tr. p. 113, II. 3-7, p. 131, II. 14-17. Van understood from the poster 
that an employee could not be discriminated against for raising safety issues that could cause injury or 
death. Tr.p.131,II.12-23. 
Van further understood that the Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation (JCAHO) required 
the hospital to follow all OSHA guidelines for its accreditation. It was Van's responsibility to compiete 
JCAHO continuing education requirements. Tr. p. 113,11. 15-19, p. 120, II. 9-12. 
The hospital's safety mission was to control both known and potential safety and health hazards 
which employees face on the job. Van was required to sign a document which outlined the hospital's 
safety mission. Tr. p. 121, p. 13-18. Each hospital employee was to "consistently work in a safe 
manner and continue to comply with all occupational health requirements and other preventive 
measures outlined in guidelines, policies and staff meetings." Tr. p. 121, p. 21-25 . Van understood this 
to mean that all OSHA standards applied to the hospital and to its employees. Tr. p. 122, II. 3-7. 
IThe citation: "Tr. pp. _, II. " are the transcripts prepared by Rodney Felshaw and the 
citation "Tr. Vol. _ p. _, II. " are the transcripts prepared by Stephanie Morse. 
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The hospital stated: "Safety and health are a shared responsibility. Everyone from the top 
management to supervisors to each and every worker must take ownership of his or her own safety and 
that of co-workers and patients." Tr. p. 122, II. 17-25, p. 123, 1. 1. Van believed it was his moral 
obligation to report the possibility of injury or death on the job. Tr. p. 123, II. 2-7. 
With regard to the hospital's plan for "Service Excellence", hospital employees were to respond 
and make sure safety hazards were corrected. Tr. p. 126,11. 9-25, p. 127,11. 1-12. Van understood this 
to mean that he needed to take an affirmative stance in the name of safety and be sure that safety issues 
were taken care of so that no one would be harmed. Tr. p. 127, 11. 14-17. Van was trained that 
employees were responsible for bringing up concerns about decisions made in their departments or 
organization, no matter how difficult or unpopular. Tr. p. 1010, 11. 12-16, p. 1013, 11. 1-4. 
The hospital's employee hand book provided that "[c]omplaints made in good faith should not 
jeopardize your job status, security or working conditions. In addition, any complaint request will not 
become part of your permanent file for the purpose of the disciplinary action." Tr. p. 841, 11. 9-20. 
2. Van's Report of Violations in 1993 
In January, 1993, Pilot Don Humphrey had to force land the helicopter, resulting in approximately 
$150,000 in helicopter damage. Tr., p. 138, II. 2-14. At the time, Don was married to Pam Humphrey, 
the program director. Tr. p. 138, 11. 15-16. Van found that snow was inside the transmission cowling 
and that ice and snow went through one of the engines. Tr. p. 140, II. 6-9. Van determined that 
according to an airworthiness directive in the flight manual, snow and ice are to be cleaned out of the 
transmission cowling and snow is to be cleaned off the roofbefore the engine is started. Additionally, 
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the helicopter is to be operated with the continuous ignition system on. Tr. p. 142,11. 5-13, p. 146,11. 
16-25. The continuous ignition system was not on that day. Tr. p. 143,11. 5-15. 
Van believed it was violation of federal aviation regulations to operate an aircraft outside of the 
scope ofthe flight manual. Tr. p. 149,11.7-11. Van wrote a report about the incident and gave itto Pam 
Humphrey. Tr.p. 149,11. 16-17. Pam Humphrey had a fit aboutthe report. Tr.p. 150,11. 16-25. Van 
believed, however, that the accident was never properly reported to the FAA. Tr. p. 157,11.9-10, p. 
158, 11. 11-24. Pam Humphrey resigned her position and became very cold toward Van. Tr. p. 166, U. 
8-20. Don Humphrey was promoted to the position of director of operations. Tr. p. 166, 1. 21. 
3. Van's Work Environment in The Year 2000. 
In 2000, Don and Pam Humphrey had marital problems. There was some marital infidelity and 
yelling and screaming in the hallways of the hospital. Tr. p. 164,11. 14-22. Mr. and Mrs. Humphrey 
were cold and short to Van. Tr. p. 167,11. 11-25. At the request ofHR Director Kim Prichard, Van 
wrote a statement about his relationship with Don and Pam Humphrey. Tr. p. 165, 11. 3-11. He 
addressed the 1993 incident and his concern that he was going to get fired. He was also concerned 
about Mr. Humphrey and his promotion to director of operations. Tr. p. 169,11. 20-25, pp. 170-171. 
Also in 2000, Van created a document about cold weather policies and sent it to Don Humphrey. 
Tr. p. 173,11. 5-23. Van felt that there were things that should be done to make sure the aircraft, as an 
air ambulance, was ready to go. Tr. p. 174,11. 1-6. Van offered to have the mechanic come in and help 
the pilot in command (PIC) any time they were needed. Tr. p. 174,11.9-13. Van indicated that he 
would sometimes come to work in the morning and find that blade covers hadn't been put. There would 
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be snow and ice all over the blades, which would take an hour or more to remove. Van also stated that 
sometimes certain pilots would sleep through the night and not keep the aircraft operationaL Tr. p. 175, 
11. 12-22. Through the submission of the cold weather policy document, he wasn't trying to undermine 
anyone, but just make the program safer, better and more efficient. Tr. p. 176, lL 10-20. 
4. Van's Involvement With the November 14,2001 Accident And Its Aftermath 
On November 14,2001, Van was called to fix LifeFlight's helicopter in a remote section ofIdaho 
between Lone Pine and Leadore. Tr. p. 177,11. 10-25, p. 178, II. 1-24, p. 179, II. 11-13. Understanding 
that Pilot Tim Brulotte was having problems with his fuel pumps, Van got some fuel drums, fuel pumps 
and equipmenttogether and went up to change the pumps with Van's son, Anthony. Tr. p. 178, IL 1-25, 
p. 179 I. 1. Van changed the fuel pumps and got the helicopter airworthy. Tr. p. 179,11. 3-25. 
Van was starting to leave when he saw a flash of light on the side of the hill. Tr. p. 179, 11. 17-19. 
Van and his son went on top of a ridge line and found the fire. Van thought for sure Brulotte was dead. 
Tr. p. 180, II. 3-6. Van found Brulotte about 15 feet from the helicopter, disconnected the helicopter's 
battery, and moved Brulotte away from the helicopter on a stretcher. Tr. p. 180,11.9-25. Van and his 
son administered first aid and covered Brulotte with blankets and some of Van's clothing. Tr. p. 204, 
11. 17-25. One ofBrulotte' s feet was hanging by a thread and the other was pointed around in the wrong 
direction Tr. p. 204, II. 9-12. Van was in shock following the accident. Tr. p. 207, 11. 18-19. 
After the accidents, news reports indicated that an aircraft crashed after maintenance and there were 
a lot of inferences that the aircraft crashed because of maintenance. Tr. p. 208, II. 21-25, p. 209,1. 1. 
A news article dated November 15,2001 in the Idaho Falls Post Register read in part, "After talking 
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with a mechanic by telephone, Speirn [the hospital's community relations director] said Brulotte tried 
to take off in the helicopter twice, but remained concerned, landed and waited for a mechanic to drive 
to Salmon to check on the aircraft." Tr. p. 209, II. 12-18. The article also stated, "'The mechanic felt 
certain the helicopter was okay,' Speirn said, 'so Brulotte went back up and crashed between one and 
1 :30 in the morning. The helicopter was not salvageable. '" Tr. p. 212, II. 10-13. 
Van felt that the newspaper article was inaccurate and that it shouldn't have been released. If 
anything was to be released, it should have been accurate. Tr. p. 213, II. 1-5. The hospital's expert, 
James Wisecup, testified this his company would not have released as much of the information that the 
hospital released just after the accident. Tr. p. 1442, p. 1443, II. 1-18. 
Van wrote an email to Audrey Fletcher, Human Resources facilitator, indicating that he was having 
trouble with people judging him guilty and asking inappropriate questions about the accident. He 
indicated that he could hardly go anywhere without having an encounter where he would have to claim 
his innocence. Tr. p. 216, II. 15-25, p. 217, II. 1-13. Anthony Van testified that a fellow student, Brent 
Newby, told him that he heard that Van made the helicopter crash. Tr. p. 351, II. 24-25, p. 352, II. 1-2. 
Van also sent an email to Teresa Roberts, who took care of employee health issues for the hospital. 
Tr. p. 218, II. 10-21. Van was bothered that the hospital wouldn't release the NTSB report on the 
accident, and that the public felt that he was guilty of something he did not cause. Tr. p. 218, II. 22-25, 
p. 219, II. 1-2. Van spoke with Life Flight Director of Operations Gary Alzola regarding information 
about the accident. Van told Alzola that he, his wife, and his kid had taken a lot of heat from the 
matter. According to Van, Alzola very gruffly told him, "well, it's yourjob". Tr. p. 224, II. 11-25. Van 
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then released the NTSB report himself to 34 or 35 media outlets. Tr. p. 226, II. 3-5. 
On September 3, 2002, a meeting was held between Van, Alzola, Fletcher and Diane Kirse who had 
replaced Gordon Roberts as Program Director. Tr. p. 227, II. 1-4, p. 229, II. 23-25. Van recalled Alzola 
stating that the FAA told him he could not release information during an accident investigation. Kirse 
then told Van that Alzola would be filling out his evaluations from then on. Tr. p. 228, II. 6-9, 13-6. 
Both Alzola and Van had been equals and reported to the program director. Tr. p. 229, II. 21-22. 
Van later asked Alzola who at the FAA told him that he couldn't release any information while an 
accident was being investigated and Alzola replied that nobody really said that to him, but that it was 
an FAA policy. Tr. p. 230, 11. 17-21. Van learned from the FAA that there was no FAA policy 
forbidding operators from releasing information to the press while an accident is under investigation. 
Tr. p. 232, II. 1-13. Van then had a meeting 'with Kirse and Fletcher in which Kirse said she wouldn't 
change Van's reporting to Alzola. The next day, Kirse resigned her position. Tr. p. 235, 11. 7-24. 
During his trial testimony, Alzola admitted that he had previously stated, "even if I had lied to 
[Van], what does that have to do with anything?" Tr. Vol. 1, p. 86, II. 5-7. Alzola further admitted that 
in deposition testimony, he stated, "I didn't know that I was required to tell Mark if! had - if! made 
a mistake." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 88, II. 11-15. Alzola did admitthat lying undermines trust. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 86. 
11. 8-9. Alzola further testified that it had occurred to him that the situation may involve trust issues but 
he didn't see the relevance of it. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 162,11. 21-25, p. 163, II. 1-7. 
In early 2003, Van scheduled a meeting with Pat Hermanson, the CEO ofthe hospital to go over 
the matters he had discussed with Kirse. Tr. p. 237, II. 18-25. Van asked that he not report to Alzola 
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and that he report to the Program Director. Hermanson agreed and made it so that Van reported back 
to the Program Director from that point forward. Tr. p. 239, 11. 20-25, p. 240, 11. 1-2. 
In February, 2003, Van provided Pam Humphrey with a grievance requesting that Alzola be 
removed from the position of Director of Operations and that LifeFlight obtain a new Director of 
Operations. Tr. p. 240, 11. 12-24, p. 242, 11. 90-12. According to Van, Humphrey told him that she had 
information that he had contributed to the accident of 2001. Tr. p. 242, 11. 15-18. 
Van later received a summary from Pam Niece, vice-president of Human Resources, Cindy 
Richardson, the division manager and Humphrey regarding his grievance against Alzola. The summary 
indicated that although Portneuf did not condone that type of activity, they couldn't tell Van what they 
had done to Alzola. Tr. p. 245, 11. 2-9, 18-25, p. 246,11. 1-3. 
Interestingly, Alzola didn't even know that Van had filed a grievance against him. Nobody told him 
at the time of the grievance. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 83, 11. 12-15, p. 84, 11. 16-18. Another meeting was held in 
July, 2003, in which Niece made light of the idea that Gary had lied to Van. Tr. p. 249, 11. 18-23, p. 
250,11. 17-21. Humphrey admitted telling Van, "There's nothing I can do with Gary. You know, I'm 
not going to terminate him." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 865,11. 16-17. 
Van sent a grievance to Pam Niece and Cindy Richardson against Pam Humphrey for making the 
accusation that she had information that Van had caused or contributed to the accident of November 
14,2001. Tr. p. 293, 11. 6-22. Van requested that Humphrey provide in writing the information she had 
that Van caused the accident. Van did not receive anything. Tr. p. 294, 11. 16-25, p.295, 1. 1. 
Humphrey wrote in a July 13, 2003 document, "Can we afford to have this type of individual 
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working on our aircraft when he is disturbed by all of these events and can't let go? 1 didn't before, 1 
guess 1 truly do have an axe to grind." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 290,11. 21-25, p. 291,1-6. 
According to Van, Pilot Ron Fergie had made the statement that if he was Tim Brulotte, he 
wouldn't tell anybody, he wouldn't tell the FAA what had happened about the accident, that they could 
figure it out by themselves. Van felt traumatized by this statement. Tr. p. 257. II. 7-17. Van prepared 
an email to Cindy Richardson, and another document to Marilyn Speirn requesting that LifeFlight 
update their policy for the release of post-accident information pertaining to the LifeFlight Helicopter. 
Tr. p. 256, 11. 12-24, p. 258, 11. 2-19 . Van included information in the documents pertaining to the 1993 
accident because it had not been reported to the FAA. Tr. p. 259, 11. 21-25, p. 260, 11. 6-13. 
In his documentation to Richardson and Speirn, Van included the statement, "I believe that Pam 
Humphrey has an ax to grind and 1 would like to be protected." Tr. p. 261, 11. 1-2. Van was not trying 
to attack Pam Humphrey. Tr. p. 262, II. 3-5. He was stating what had happened in the past so it 
wouldn't happen in the future. Tr. p. 261, II. 23-34. Van subsequently received the finished post-
accident policy and did not complain about it. Tr. p. 262, 11. 2-25, p. 263, 11. 1-4. 
On September 19, 2003. Van also received a summary of a discussion between him and Pam Niece 
which was prepared by Pam Humphrey. Tr. p. 330, 11.10-18, p. 331, 11. 3-17. The summary contained 
various accusations regarding Van's behavior. Tr. p. 331, 11. 20-25, p. 333-336. At the back of the 
summary, it was written that the summary would not go into Van's employee file. Tr. p. 332, 11.17-21. 
Van never did sign the summary. Pam Humphrey told him not to worry about it. Tr. p. 369, II. 23-24. 
Van responded in part to the summary by stating: 
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I know you don't agree with everything I've said and I don't wish to anger you, but it is what 
I believe to be the truth. I don't agree with everything you have stated. This will lead to more 
bad feelings and destruction if it continues, so could we please put the accident and the 
aftermath behind us? Tr. p. 372, 11. 3-9. 
5. Van's Report of Fergie's 20 Hours of Duty Time. 
On July 4th, 2003, Van got a call that the LifeFlight crew were stuck in Salt Lake City. Van sent a 
mechanic, Frank Prickett, to repair the helicopter. Tr. p. 263, 11. 18-25, p. 264, 11. 1-2. It was two 
o'clock in the morning before Prickett got to fix the helicopter. While Pricket was driving home, he 
called Van and told him that pilot Ron Fergie, had been on duty 20 hours and that he didn't want to be 
involved in another accident. He questioned that ifhe was so tired to drive home that he had to pull 
over in a rest area, what about the pilot? Tr. p. 264, 11-19. 
Back in 2001, Fergie had written a report identifYing Brulotte's fatigue from being on duty for 17 
hours as being a major contributor to the accident. Tr. p. 266,1. 25, p. 267,11. 1-4, Vol. 1, p. 748, 11.24-
25, p. 749,11. 1-4. Fergie admitted that at the time of Brulotte's accident, the organization had no 
written policy for a pilot that has exceed his duty day. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 750, 11. 13-15. A policy was 
implemented after the day Fergie flew 20 hours. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 751, 11. 9-12. 
Van believed that Fergie's 20 hour duty time created an unsafe workplace and violated OSHA. Tr. 
p. 267, 11. 8-12. Pilot Barry Neilsen informed Van that when Fergie came back from that flight, he 
altered documents to make it appear that he had gotten his appropriate amount of crew rest time before 
he took his next flight the following day. Tr. p. 267, 11. 15-22. Neilsen testified that he was initially 
concerned that possibly Fergie had altered records. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 580, 11. 18-24. 
Pilot Chad Waller also informed Van that Fergie's rest time records had been altered to make it look 
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as ifhe'd not violated the crew rest time. Tr. p. 268, 11.1-7. Waller testified that when he was hired 
in February, 2002, he received the verbal training that after about 16 hours of pilot duty time, they were 
to cease operations. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 469, 11. 14-21. Waller assumed that policy was in affect when Fergie 
had a 20 hour duty time, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 469, 11. 24-25, p. 470, 1. 1. Waller observed on the helipad that 
Fergie was fatigued after the late night flight and told Fergie that he looked pretty tired. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
471, 11. 10-15. 
Fergie was the chiefpiiot and safety officer when he had the 20-hour duty time and didn't get the 
10 hours crew rest. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 473, 11. 17-23. Waller talked to Fergie about getting ten hours rest 
between flights and Fergie responded, "I know. I immediately called Gary Alzola ... and told him 
about it. And I'm going to have to take a hit from the F.A.A." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 465, n. 4-11. 
Waller confirmed that after Fergie's 20 hour duty time, the verbal policy of 16 hours was changed 
to a written policy. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 471, 11. 24-25, p. 472,11. 1-2. Van took up the duty time issue in a 
LifeFlight Leadership meeting in August, 2003. Tr. p. 264, 11. 24-25, p. 265, 1. 1. Alzola kept saying 
that Fergie didn't do anything wrong. Tom Mortimer said he didn't want his crew flying around tired 
pilots and that Tim Brulotte had been on duty only 17 hours when there was an accident. Van told 
Alzola that his mechanics weren't going to release an aircraft to a tired pilot. Tr. p. 265, 11. 2-9. Alzola 
responded that the mechanics couldn't tell the pilots ifthey were going to fly or not. Tr. p. 265, 11. 18-
23. Alzola later said that he would write a post-maintenance policy. However, this policy would have 
only affected flights after maintenance when the pilots had enough rest. Tr. p. 265, 1. 25, p. 266, 11. 1-8. 
In trial testimony, Alzola confirmed previous testimony that Fergie's 20 hour duty time was a gross 
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error in judgment. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 92, 11. 22-25, p. 93,11. 1-17. Alzola didn't write Fergie up for the 
incident. Tr. p. 93, 11. 21-22. 
According to Alzola, Fergie's not receiving 10 hours crew rest was never reported to him. Tr. p. 
106,11. 2-8. Fergie, however, claimed that he told Alzola about getting less than 10 hours rest. Tr. Vol. 
1, p. 716, 11. 20-25, p. 717, 11. 1-3. 
Because ofthe August, 2003, meeting, Van wrote Policy Letter 12. He instructed his crew not to 
release an aircraft to a tired pilot. Tr. p. 298, 11. 11-15. He didn't want to be involved in another 
accident he could have stopped. Tr. p. 301, 11. 5-6. At the end ofthe policy, Van wrote, "We have the 
power to create a safer LifeFlight program. The pilots will be tired and pissed off that they can't take 
off, but they will be alive and maybe appreciate it later. I would never reprimand you for not following 
this policy, but I hope that you find it to be the right thing to do." Tr. p. 301, 11.22-25, p. 302,11.1-2. 
Van didn't recall one word spoken by the mechanics about Policy Letter 12. No concerns were 
raised. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1218, 11. 1-3. Humphrey testified that she didn't see LifeFlight Maintenance Policy 
Letter 12 prior to Van's termination. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 307, 11. 2-7. Fletcher confirmed that the policy letter 
was not used in forming her recommendations to have Van terminated. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 401, 11. 1-12. 
6. Van's Report of Fergie's September 2003 Low Level Flight 
Shortly after the August, 2003 meeting, Van saw Fergie in the hallway. Fergie was so angry at Van 
that he couldn't talk to him. Tr. p. 302, 11. 22-25, p. 303, 11. 1-4. On September 7, 2003, Van was at 
home sitting at his kitchen table when he heard the loudest noise he had ever heard at home. Tr. p. 302, 
11.21-22, p. 303, 11. 6-14. Van got up, ran out to his living room windows, and saw LifeFlight in his 
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picture window. The helicopter was unsteady, rocking back and forth. Van believed the helicopter was 
about 150 feet above the residential area. He learned that Fergie was the pilot. Tr. p. 303, 11. 14-24. 
Van asked crew members Mark Romero and Laura Vice if they had noticed anything, but Van 
didn't get any feedback from them. Tr. p. 303, 11. 24-25, p. 304, 11. 1-5. Van believed that Fergie 
intentionally flew directly over his house. Van believed that it was harassment for raising the issue of 
Fergie's 20 hour duty day in the August LifeFlight meeting. Tr. p. 304,11.6-13. Van testified that as 
a result of many maintenance flights with Fergie, Fergie knew where he lived. Van had specific 
recollections of showing Fergie his house. Tr. p. 304, 11. 25, p. 305, 1. 1. 
Van sent an email to Alzola two days after the incident and believed that he sent another email to 
Pam Humphrey also. Tr. p. 305, 11. 4-10. When he reported the incident, Van believed that Fergie's 
low level flight was a violation of rules, laws or regulations of the United States. Tr. p. 307,11. 22-25, 
p. 308, ll. 1-7. The incident eroded Van's trust in Fergie. He saw no positive outcome of confronting 
Fergie for flying over his house. Tr. p. 311, 4-6, 13-15. 
Regarding the low level flight in 2003, Fergie recalled flying close to Van's neighborhood. Tr. Vol. 
1, p. 632, 11. 15-17. Fergie testified that Alzola told him that he probably should have used better 
judgment. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 719, 11. 3-20. 
7. Van's Involvement with the Agusta Helicopter and the COMP Contract 
Van was involved in the negotiations for a new helicopter. Tr. p. 311, 11. 16-18. A Component 
Overhaul and Maintenance Program (COMP) contract was signed and there became problems with the 
helicopter. Tr. p. 314, 11. 4-5. Van understood the contract to read that if everything is not followed 
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in the contract by the hospital, that the vendor would not have to refund any ofthe hospital's money. 
He believed that $600,000 of the county's assets could be lost because they were not or could not 
follow the contract. Tr. p. 316, p. 5-13. Van addressed two sections of the contract as follows: 
Customer acknowledges and agrees that all payments made to AAC pursuant to this agreement 
are final and are not subject to refund to customer for any reason, induding but not limited to 
expiration of this agreement or termination of this agreement regardless of cause. 
* * * An event of default shall occur ifthe customer shall fail for any reason whatsoever, voluntarily 
or involuntarily, to, 1 ... make any payment required under this agreement when due. Or two, 
observe and adhere to any other provision of this agreement. Tr. p. 318, 11. 4-9, 15-21. 
One ofthe requirements ofthe COMP Contract was that all mechanics who worked on the aircraft 
had to be AAC trained. The contract provided, "Customer further agrees that the aircraft will be 
maintained only by FAA licensed mechanics who have satisfactorily completed the Agusta 109 
airframe maintenance course conducted by AAC". Tr. p. 321,11.23-25, p. 320, 11.1-2. The mechanics 
that Van hired on a contract basis were not all ACC trained. Tr. p. 319, 11. 20-24. Van believed that 
the assets ofthe hospital were not protected and that the contract should allow a mechanic to work on 
the helicopter with an Agusta trained mechanic. Tr. p. 319, 1. 25, p. 320,11.1-4. 
According to Van, Agusta wouldn't keep its promise of covering all parts costing over $100.00. 
Tr. p. 320, 11. 9-20. Van tried to get the COMP contract changed, and Agusta's parent company 
wouldn't let the hospital change the contract. Tr. p. 322, 11. 12-21. Van suggested to the hospital that 
it hold Agusta's feet to the fire and get the contract fixed. Tr. p. 323, 11.8-9. In response, Van received 
an email response from Hermanson that Van couldn't believe Hermanson wrote. Tr.p.323,1l. 10-13. 
Former Program Director Gordon Roberts considered Van's issues with the Agusta helicopter to 
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be reasonable. Tr. p. 692, 11. 2-12. Pam Humphrey indicated that Van's interactions with Agusta 
deteriorated to the point where an Agusta mechanic walked off the job and stated that he could not work 
with anymore. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 279, 11. 20-25. Agusta representative Greg Schilling testified that he did 
not have any trouble getting along with Van. Schilling never refused to work with Van. Tr. p. 549,11. 
18-25, p550, 11. 14-15. 
Schilling became involved with Van once the helicopter was purchased. Tr. p. 547, 11. 6-9. He met 
with Van multiple times, possibly dozens oftimes, in Pocatello. Tr. p. 548, 11. 8-17. Schilling was not 
aware of Van' s issues with the Agusta. Van gave Schilling the impression that he loved the helicopter. 
Tr. p. 557,11.3-11. Schilling realized that Van was very, very thorough. Tr. p. 552,11. 8-11. 
Schilling was very surprised when he heard that Van had been terminated. Tr. p. 553,11.5-11. 
When asked why he was surprised, Schilling stated: 
Well, because you don't let people like that go. When you've got a person like that that can 
maintain a helicopter the way he does and keep the records the way he does, I can't understand 
any reason to ever let a person like that go. So I was - I didn't know what happened at the time, 
but the - at the time I heard it I think I heard it from someone in our company. I was - I was 
shocked. Tr. p. 553,11. 12-20. 
Humphrey received an email from Van about the COMP contract, which she understood to include 
Van's concerns that the mechanics working on the aircraft needed to be school-trained and that "things 
in the contract were more verbal agreements rather than put in writing." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 264, 11. 13-25, 
p. 265, 11.1-6. Thirteen minutes after Humphrey responded to Van thanking him for the information 
on the Agusta, she emailed her boss stating in part, "I know you do not know the history here, but he 
does not trust anyone, and he's always causing problems of some sort." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 265, 11. 7-17, p. 
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266, 11. 24-25, p. 267, 11. 1-6. Humphrey was asked if her email promoted team building and she 
responded that she couldn't answer the question. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 269, p. 8-14. 
8. Van's Reports of Pilots' Errors and Omissions. 
In the fall of2003, Van went to work one morning and found the engine cowling on the helicopter 
was deformed, bent, damaged, and burnt. Tr. p. 324, 11. 12-19. Van reported the damaged cowling to 
Pam Humphrey about the matter and she got really mad at him. Tr. p. 324, 11. 19-21, p. 325, 11. 10-11. 
Alzola wrote up pilot Neilsen for not engaging or latching the engine cowling. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 95, 11. 2-4. 
In December, 2003, Van was out at the airport to do maintenance when he watched the helicopter 
coming in, in the dark. He saw Fergie flying the aircraft from the hospital to the airport without lights. 
Tr. p. 325, 21-25, p. 326, 11. 1-11. The switches were off in the cockpit. Tr. p. 327, 11. 20-24. Van 
believed that had Fergie gone by the checklist according to FAA requirements, the lights would have 
been on. Tr. p. 328, 11. 2-10, p. 329,11. 16-24. Van reported the incident to Alzola. Van believed it was 
very dangerous to fly in the dark into an airport with no lights on. Tr. p. 329,1. 25, p. 330, 11. 1, 7-9. 
Fergie admitted that he that he flew with some lights off. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 619, 1. 25, p. 620, 1. 1. The 
issue of Fergie's flying without lights was never raised to Humphrey. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 972, 11. 14-22. At 
trial, Alzola claimed he didn't know about Fergie flying the helicopter with the lights off. Tr. Vol. 1, 
p. 105, 11. 19-23. 
In May, 2004, Van reviewed flight records after Fergie had returned from a flight and found that 
Fergie had overflown an airworthiness directive, a violation ofthe Federal Aviation Regulations. Tr. 
p. 375, 11. 9-17. Before every flight, each pilot had to sign an airworthiness directive. Tr. p. 594, 11. 21-
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25. The airworthiness directive in this instance required that the aircraft not be flown over the 25 hour 
mark without a tail rotor inspection. Tr. p. 1218,11. 18-24. Van reported the overflight to Alzolajust 
moments after Fergie had left the helipad. Tr. p. 375.11. 18-21, p. 376, 11. 11-14. Van felt that Alzola's 
response to the report indicated that Alzola was trying to protect Fergie. Tr. p. 376, 11. 8-10. 
By June 22, Van realized that the overflight of the airworthiness directive had not been disclosed, 
and may never be disclosed, so he reported the overflight in a document to Lynn Higgins, FAA 
Operations Inspector. Tr. p. 593, 11. 17-25, p. 594, 11. 1-8, p. 602, 11. 8-12. Van felt that after talking 
to Alzola and Pam Humphrey, they were never going to disclose that an airworthiness directive was 
overflown. Tr. p. 595, 11. 22-25, p. 596, 11. 1-2. Van's name was on the sign-off sheet for the 
airworthiness directives which implicated him in the overflight. He did not want to be part of covering 
it up or not disclosing it. Tr. p. 596, 11. 12-19. It was Van's understanding that if the FAA found 
something that was known and hadn't been reported, they would take as hard of an action against you 
as they possibly could. Tr. p. 602, 11. 19-24. 
Defendant's expert, William Patterson, would have reprimanded Fergie for not getting sufficient 
crew rest and for overflying an airworthiness directive. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1099, 11. 4-13. Despite the facts 
the Fergie was counseled by Alzola on the 20 hour duty time, and discussed with Alzola the low-level 
flight in Van's neighborhood, the flight without lights and the overflight ofthe airworthiness directive, 
Fergie was promoted to be the Director of Operations. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 755,1. 11-25, p. 756, 11. 1-5. 
9. Van's Reporting of Workload Concerns 
Van wrote an email to Pam Humphrey in May, 2004, in which he addressed his concerns about his 
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work load. Tr. p. 597,11. 7-9. Van had a new helicopter with new maintenance issues that he had never 
done before. He was having to work so many hours in so many days in a row, he felt that he might 
overlook something because he had so much to do, so much to take care of, and so much to concentrate 
on. Tr. p. 598,11. 2-11. Van felt that it was the start of an unsafe workplace and would be violation of 
OSHA law. Tr. p. 598,11. 21-25, p. 599, 11.3-10. 
Van also felt that the overtime situation was violating the CAMTS which the hospital had to follow 
in order to keep certification. Tr. p. 605, 11. 7-21. (The court later ruled that the CAMTS certitlcation 
was not part of the trial.) Tr. p. 618, 11. 10-14. Van also addressed an FAA advisory circular which 
required that "each certificate holder should provide relief for each person performing maintenance 
from duty for a period of at least 24 consecutive hours during any consecutive days, or the equivalent 
thereof, within one calendar month." Tr. p. 874.11. 18-23, p. 4-14. Van felt that ifhe did maintenance 
outside ofthe advisory circular and the FAA found out, he would run the risk oflosing his license. Tr. 
p. 618, 11. 16-25, p. 619, 11. 1-5. 
In July/August, 2004, Van was really worried that he was going to make a mistake. He requested 
that he be allowed to see a counselor of his own choosing about his experience in the accident of200 1. 
Tr. p. 613, 11. 8-16. The only remedy the hospital gave him was the EAP. Tr. p. 614, 11. 1-2. Van made 
a worker's compensation claim to have therapy paid for, but the claim was denied. Tr. p. 615, 11. 6-22. 
Van sent another email to Pam Humphrey on July 1,2004, because his workload was getting worse. 
Tr. p. 603, 11. 6-8, 19-21. Van requested what was expected of him as far as a working schedule in 
writing. Tr. p. 607,11.20-25, p. 608, 11. 1. He was not making any specific demands as to a solution, 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF -23-
but wanted to negotiate a working solution to the problem. Tr. p. 608, 1. 25, p. 609, 11. 1-7. 
In July, Van couldn't get any work out of his occasional mechanics. Tr. p. 604, 11. 22-25. OnJuly 
28, 2004, Van sent an email to the whole crew which, in part, addressed the need to staff the LifeFlight 
maintenance department for the increased down downtime attributed to the helicopter's complex nature. 
Tr. p. 616, 11.14-25,11.617, p. 1-13. Van indicated that the mechanics under him didn't have to work 
unless they wanted to; they had their own jobs. Tr. p. 598,11. 1-14. Greg Stoltz testified that as an 
occasional mechanic, he could tell Van when there was a time he couldn't work and that Van couldn't 
force him to work. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 525, 11. 19-24. 
In August, 2004, Pam Humphrey sent Van an email asking for justification for hiring another 
mechanic, the work load requirements justifYing additional staff Tr. p. 619, 11. 6-16. By that time, Van 
had already submitted to Pam Humphrey, two two-paged documents as well as emails that had 
addressed the issues. Tr. p. 621, 11. 17-22. 
In September, 2004, Van wrote an email notifYing the pilots that he didn't have time to do the 
inspections and that they need to do a better, more thorough, preflight inspection to pick up the slack. 
He indicated, "In order to catch up I'm going to forego the preflight inspection again today." Tr. p. 634, 
11. 3-20. Also in September, Van wrote a document which he entitled Justification For Hiring 
Additional Maintenance Staff. Tr. p. 639, 11. 5-11, p. 640, 11. 3-5. In the document, Van listed how he 
had worked 60-90 or more hours per week. Tr. p. 641, 11. 18-25, p.642, 11. 1-4. He could have taken 
more days to do the work, but the aircraft would have been out of service, there would have been no 
revenue produced, and no lives saved or pain and suffering reduced. Tr. p. 643, 11. 5-19. 
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After Van submitted his justification for hiring to Pam Humphrey, Humphrey again wrote to her 
boss stating in part, "If [V an] is not terminated, then I need to have human resources and 
administration's support in beginning an aggressive disciplinary process in which immediate correction 
is necessary or termination will result within 30 days." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 274, 11. 1-16, p. 275, 1. 1, p. 276, 
11. 1-6. Humphrey admitted she was asking for Van's termination, and yet, for the 10-1-2003 to 10-1-
2004 period, she gave him a respectable evaluation. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 276, 11. 6-21. 
Also included in Humphrey's email to her boss was the following statement: 
I have attached a few examples of e-mails to other managers and directors who have most 
recently found Mark to be difficult to work with and he responds to them in a defensive manner. 
Tr. Vol I, p. 275, 11.8-18. 
When asked whether the above statement was team building on Humphrey's part, Humphrey 
responded "I can't answer that. I'm sorry." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 275, 11. 15-22. 
Van wasn't getting anywhere with Pam Humphrey on his request for additional staffing, so he 
turned to Audrey Fletcher. Tr. p. 877, 11. 13-17, p. 878, 11. 9-17. A new mechanic was finally hired to 
help Van on November 22,2004. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 279, 11. 14-16. Van believed he got the help because 
he went to Audrey Fletcher. Tr. p. 894, 11. 6-12. 
10. Van's Cold Weather Policy Issues and Report onncidents once and Snow on the Helicopter's 
Rotor Blades 
During the last weekend of October, Greg Stoltz was in the process of de-icing the aircraft when 
he went in the hospital to get something and to contact the pilot. When he got back to the helicopter, 
he saw it flying away. Stoltz informed Van ofthe incident, reporting that he was worried pilot Neilsen 
had flown the aircraft with ice on the main blades. Tr. p. 894,11. 15-25, p. 895,11. 1-4. Van asked Stoltz 
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to write a summary ofthe occurrence as result of a February 28,2005 meeting in which Fergie indicated 
that according to Stoltz, there was just frost on the rotor blades. Tr. p. 895, 11.8-10,897,11. 9-18. 
Stoltz' statement indicated that, "On the weekend of October 31, 2004, I found ice and snow 
accumulation on the blades of the helicopter. The blade covers had not been installed the night before." 
The statement was consistent with what Stoltz had informed V an about the incident. Tr. p. 898, 11. 2-8. 
Stoltz also stated, "As I was walking back out to finish de-icing the blades, the helicopter was leaving 
on a mission. On the first leg ofthe flight I was later advised that the hour meter did not work and had 
started working." This was also consistent with what Stoltz had verbally told Van. Tr. p. 899, 11. 2-7. 
Stoltz further stated: 
Monday I spoke to you about my concerns with ice on the blades, not only for helicopter safety, 
but for ice being flung into the parking lot and the street. 
* * * I believe it was a few weeks later than Ron contacted me to ask me about this incident. I 
advised Ron of my concerns again about the ice being thrown off the blades into the parking 
lot and damage to the helicopter. He informed me that he would bring this up at the next safety 
meeting and discuss it with all pilots. Tr. p. 899,11. 14-25 
Regarding the above memo, Stoltz testified that when Van asked him to write it, Van did not 
intimidate him in any way or tell him what to write. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 515, 11. 14-20. It was Van's 
understanding that Fergie was the pilot the night before Neilsen flew and that Fergie didn't put the 
blade covers on, so the unsafe condition of the aircraft was handed to Neilsen and Stoltz who found it 
hours later. Tr. p. 910,11. 19-25, p. 911, 11. 1-2. 
Van testified that F ederal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 135.227, addressing icy conditions and 
operating limitations, pertained to Neilsen's flight because the regulation clearly states that no pilot may 
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take off in an aircraft that has frost, ice or snow adhering to any rotor blade. Tr. p. 945, 11. 25, p. 946, 
1. 1, p. 949, 11. 22-25, p. 950, ll. 1-11. From what Stoltz had explained to him, Van felt that Neilsen's 
flight was a violation of Federal Aviation Regulations. Tr. p. 950, 11. 9-11. 
In trial, Stoltz confirmed his deposition testimony that he probably had seen enough ice on the 
blades that he thought that there was a real possibility that stuff could be flung into the parking lot that 
morning. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 517, ll. 20-25, p. 518,11. 1-10. That morning, it was the pilot's responsibility 
to take the snow and ice off the helicopter. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 521, ii. 6-8. Stoltz had no idea if Neilsen did 
a thorough pre-flight inspection when Neilsen came on shift. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 520, ll. 21-23. 
Defendant's expert Patterson testified that if a pilot did not do an actual FAA preflight inspection 
to check for ice, that would relate to the safety of an aircraft's passenger and crew if the pilot were to 
operate the aircraft. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1062, 11. 14-17.Patterson testified that if Stoltz had concerns about 
the snow and ice, he should have taken the helicopter out of service and made an entry into the logbook. 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1066, ll. 16-19. 
Neilsen disputed Stoltz's statement that there was snow and ice on the blades. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 576, 
11. 12-15. Regarding the incident, however, Neilsen didn't have any specific recollection ofthe morning 
at all. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 574, ll. 19-22. Neilsen admitted that a person can't see problems with the blade if 
there is snow and ice on it. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 575, 11. 23-24. Neilsen testified that with regard to the FAA's 
investigation ofthe October 30thl3I st incident, they never talked to him, interviewed him, or asked him 
any questions whatsoever about it. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 579, 11. 22-25. 
Neilsen testified that he has occasion to make mistakes, which have included not securing a cowling 
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on the aircraft, not securing a fuel cap and losing the cap, and tapping the top of a fence with the tail 
skid. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 559,11. 6-23. Neilsen testified that he wouldn't fly with snow and ice on the rotor 
blades, but he also testified that he wouldn't normally leave the engine cowling unlatched, the fuel cap 
off or hit a fence with a tail skid. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 595, 11. 13-24. 
In November or December of 2004, Alzola told Van that he was going to put together a new cold 
weather policy for the new helicopter. Tr. p. 901, 11. 19-21. Van then wrote up two pages of 
recommendations and emailed them to Alzola. Van then came up with some more thoughts and sent 
two pages of recommendations to Fergie. Tr. p. 902, 11. 9-12. In the recommendations, Van wrote, 
"prior to the night shift, pilot getting off duty, the night pilot at 6:30 a.m. will do a walk-around 
inspection of the aircraft to inspect for air worthiness. He will also inspect the main rotor blades for 
frost, ice or snow." Tr. p. 903, 11. 11-15. Van testified that many times the morning pilot would come 
on shift and find that the night pilot did not take care ofthe aircraft. Van felt that the night pilot should 
not leave an unsafe aircraft for another pilot or crew. Tr. p. 903, 11. 19-25, p. 904, ll. 1-8. 
Van observed the aircraft in an unairworthy condition many hours after the preflight inspection 
should have been performed. Tr. p. 904, 11. 14-19. Van understood that the pilots were required to 
perform 7 :00 a.m. and 7 :00 p.m. preflight inspections and that all air surfaces, including the main rotor 
blades, the tail rotor blades, the horizontal stabilizer, and the vertical stabilizer, had to be free of ice and 
snow according to the federal aviation regulations. Tr. p. 904, 11. 24-25, p. 905, 11. 1-4. A proper 
preflight inspection cannot be performed with snow and ice on the helicopter. Tr. p. 912, 11. 4-11. 
In his cold weather recommendations, Van stated, "We need to do better. LifeFlight personnel need 
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to be held accountable for cold weather operations." Van felt that the pilots were not being held 
accountable and it was just setting up another unsafe situation, another injury, accident, or death. Tr. 
p. 905, 11. 21-25, p. 906, 11. 1-6. Van also recommended the following: 
Dispatch should monitor the weather outside. If it is snowing, the pilot on duty should be 
notified. If it is raining and close to the temperature that it will freeze, the main rotor and tail 
rotor blades should be wiped down with a towel and the blade covers installed. Tr. p. 909, 11. 
8-13. 
Van got the idea of wiping down the blades from Alzola and Waller. Tr. p. 910, 11. 3-8. 
Ann McCarty worked as the communications supervisor for the hospital's communication center. 
Tr. p. 1655,11. 16-18. McCarty approved ofa form Van wanted to implement with regard to taking the 
aircraft out of service, or showing that it was unairworthy. Tr. p. 1670,11. 18-25, p. 1671,11. 1-5. Van 
also talked to McCarty about dispatch monitoring the weather and then telling the pilots. Tr. p. 1671, 
11. 6-9. McCarty suggested Van raise the idea in a LifeFlight Leadership meeting. Tr. p. 1671,11. 21-23. 
In January, 2005, a LifeFlight safety meeting was held in which the cold weather policy was 
supposed to be discussed. Because Van had been told by Pam Humphrey that he couldn't raise safety 
issues unless cleared by Alzola or Humphrey first, Van talked to Humphrey about the cold weather 
issues. Humphrey did not want Van to raise the issues. In the safety meeting, Humphrey asked Fergie 
ifthe cold weather policy had been taken care of and Fergie responded that it had. Van was not allowed 
to discuss the policy. Tr. p. 913, 11. 5-23. 
Van's cold weather recommendations were not all accepted and the issue came to a head on 
February 1,2005 when Van found snow and ice under the main rotor blade covers. Tr. p. 915, 11. 7-17. 
Van went out to do a daily preflight inspection at approximately 8:45 in the morning. Once he had 
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pulled the blade covers off and found snow and ice, he immediately called Dispatch and told them that 
the aircraft was out of service because ofthe snow and ice. Fergie had not done his preflight inspection. 
Tr. p. 915, 11. 23-25, p. 916, 11. 1-19. After de-icing the helicopter, Van reported the incident to Alzola 
and Humphrey. Tr. p. 918, 11. 21-23, p. 922, 11.16-20. 
Van believed that Fergie didn't keep the aircraft in a safe condition to start with the night before 
by placing blade covers on unairworthy blades, and that Fergie didn't perform his preflight inspection 
at 7:00 a.m. the next morning. Tr. p. 952,11. 3-8. Mechanic Dave Perkins also reported finding snow 
and ice under the rotor blade covers to Van the same winter. Tr. p. 925, 11. 20-25, p. 926, ll. 1-8. Van 
testified, "The blade covers are there to keep snow and ice off, not to cover it up. Tr. p. 927, 11. 18-19. 
Waller recalled this incident regarding putting covers on the rotor blades with Fergie. Tr. Vol. 
1, p. 465, ll. 12-15. According to Waller, it started snowing fairly heavily and Waller grabbed a blade 
cover, a towel and a ladder, and proceeded to slide the blade cover on as he wiped the snow off. Fergie 
told him that he didn't need to that because the blade covers would knock the snow off. It didn't work. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 465, 11. 24-25, p. 466, ll. 1-10. 
Van received an email dated February 17,2005 from Alzola in response to Van's February 1,2005 
report. Tr. p. 953, 11. 22-25, p. 954, 11. 1-2. In the email, Alzola wrote, 
I've said it before and I'll say it again, as long as the aircraft is parked out in the elements, there 
will be times when it is not flyable due to ice, snow, frost, et cetera. It has always been that way 
and will continue during our Idaho winters. We will do what is practical to minimize these 
situations. Tr. p. 956, 11. 3-9. 
The above statement upset Van and he responded by stating the following: 
Leaving the aircraft out of service due to a lack of performance is not practical. You are right, 
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there will be situations where we get a freezing rain or it gets cold very fast during a 
precipitation event and causes a big mess. The snow left under the blade covers was pure apathy 
and negligence. This was the second time this winter ice was found under the blade covers. Tr. 
p. 956, 11. 8-15, p. 958, 11. 16-22. 
In his February 17 email, Alzola also wrote: 
We appreciate advice and information from the mechanics and crew members in regard to any 
condition or situation that may affect aircraft worthiness. However, only the PIC [pilot in 
command] has the responsibility and authority to determine aircraft worthiness. Tr. p.959, 11. 
5-10. 
Van responded that the maintenance department had been determining airworthiness for 20 years. 
Tr. p.959, 11. 15-20. For anything that was a safety issue, the maintenance department could tell 
dispatch that the aircraft was out of service. Nobody raised the issue until Alzola made the statement 
in the February 17 email. Tr.p.959,11.23-25,p.960,1l. 1-2. 
Alzola's email directed Van to explain his concerns with the pilot, and ifnecessary, the pilot would 
take the aircraft out of service. Tr. p. 960, 11. 22-24. Van responded, "LifeFlight maintenance has a 
policy in place to take the aircraft out of service and will continue to use it at our discretion; and will 
discuss with the pilot in command after the unsafe condition has been recorded." Tr. p. 961, 11. 1-5. 
Van understood that FAR 43.11 required him to write up any discrepancy with the aircraft that 
would make it unairworthy if he was doing an inspection on the aircraft. Tr. p.963, 11. 5-8, p. 964, 11. 
24-25, p. 965, 11. 1-3. Van would make an entry that the aircraft was unairworthy in the log book to 
fulfill the FAA requirement of 43.11. Tr. p. 966, 11. 20-25. 
At trial, Alzola admitted that mechanics were also responsible for determining whether the aircraft 
is in condition for a safe flight. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 150,11.7-10. Alzola further testified that with regard to 
the aircraft being ready 2417, LifeFlight was supposed to be an air ambulance. It was supposed to be 
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ready to respond 2417. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 59,11.18-23. 
11. Van's Report of Pilot Barry Nielson's Actions Toward Van 
On February 25,2005, Van was working on the aircraft when Neilsen went through the gate and 
onto the helipad. Van said hello and Neilsen didn't respond. Neilsen walked up to Van and said that 
Van was going to run the program into the crapper. Tr. p.97I, 11. 19-24. Neilsen said that he was tired 
of all of "these e-mails" flying around. Tr. p. 972,11. 6-9. Van replied that he didn't know what Neilsen 
was talking about and Neilsen turned around and walked away, stating in an unpleasant voice that Van 
was going to find out. Tr. p. 971, 11. 24-25, p. 972, 11. 1-2. Van felt threatened because Neilsen 
slammed the gate and was visibly upset. Tr. p. 972, 11. 2-10. Van felt that it was similar to someone 
challenging him to a fight or that they were going to do something. Tr. p. 973, ll. 13-16. 
Van had not sent any emails to Neilsen. Tr. p.981, 11. 20-21. Van later learned that Fergie had either 
shown Neilsen, or told him about the email response that Van had sent to Alzola. Van thought it had 
made Neilsen mad that Van had brought up Neilsen's October, 2004 incident of ice on the blades. Tr. 
p. 972, 11. 16-21. 
Neilsen confirmed Van's testimony regarding the emails. Neilsen testified that he was in the office 
talking to Fergie. Fergie was telling Nielsen things in Van's email about how they weren't doing their 
job. Neilsen claimed there were a lot of derogatory things in the email.Tr. Vol. 1, p. 549, ll. 19-25, 
p. 550, 11. 1-6. Neilsen testified that Fergie and Alzola showed him the emails that were sent to Alzola. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 581, 11. 20-22. Neilsen admitted that Fergie, Alzola and Mortimer were all talking about 
Van' s emailsthatwerenotaddressedtoNeilsen.Tr.Vol.l.p.582.ll. 8-14. It was just a few minutes 
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after Neilsen had read an email with Fergie that Neilsen went out to the helipad. Tr.Vo1.1,p.585,11. 
5-12. Neilsen was angry. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 550, 11. 18-19. 
Pam Humphrey acknowledged that Neilsen's actions toward Van were wrong, but Van didn't see 
Humphrey take any steps to investigate the issue. Tr. p. 973, 11. 1-13. Humphrey turned the matter over 
to Alzola. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 262, 11. 19-21. Van talked to Alzola and told him that he would like to talk to 
Neilsen. Alzola replied that he didn't think Neilsen was going to talk to him about it. Tr. p. 973, 11. 22-
25. Alzola testified that Neilsen reported having heated words with Van, but he didn't tell Alzola 
exactly what he said and Alzola didn't inquire further. Alzola did not report the incident to Human 
Resources or Pam Humphrey. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 105,11. 11-18. 
In a February 28,2004 meeting, Alzola stated that it was none of the mechanic's business ifthere 
was ice and snow on the blades, that it was between the FAA and the pilots. Tr. p. 974, 11. 8-22. Van 
felt that the statement was typical of Alzola' s condescending attitude. Tr. p. 977 11. 4-7. Van just sat 
through the meeting and tried to talk Alzola into making changes. Tr. p. 975, 11. 6-7. Van stated that 
he needed assurances that things were being taken care of. Tr. p.975, 11. 11-13. 
Flight nurse/paramedic Lance Taysom found the pilots to be condescending. Alzola was 
condescending on more than one occasion. He didn't find condescension to be justified in any position. 
Tr. p. 1542,11. 10-20. He thought there was probably more than one occasion when he questioned 
Alzola's decision making on whether LifeFlight could or could not accept a flight. Tr. p. 1543,11. 3-6. 
He testified there were several times he felt like he couldn't approach Alzola. Tr. p. 1543, 11. 7-9. 
Flight paramedic Greg Vickers found Alzola to be condescending on occasion. Tr. p. 1586,11.3-4. 
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McCarty also found Alzola to be condescending. According to McCarty, "[i]t was known that it was 
Gary's way or the highway." Tr. p. 1675,11. 10-17. 
12. LifeFlight Management's Treatment of Van Prior to his Termination 
At the end of a LifeFlight leadership meeting on March 24,2005, the time was given to anyone with 
safety issues. Van started to say that he had an issue about Fergie, but since Fergie was not there , 
and then he was immediately cut offby Humphrey who stated that she was going to have Lance Taysom 
set up a special safety meeting to talk about Van's issue. Tr. p. 989, 11. 14-25, p. 990, 11. 1-13. Taysom 
testified, however, that he never received any message from Humphrey indicating that she wanted to 
call a special safety meeting subsequent to the March 24, 2005, Life Flight Leadership meeting. Tr. p. 
1524,11. 19-25, p. 1525,11. 1-6, 17-21. 
When the March 24 LifeFlight Leadership meeting ended, a LifeFlight meeting began in which 
Fergie gave a speech about how it was everybody's responsibility to break the links in the chain of 
events that cause accidents. Tr. p. 990, 11. 17-25, p. 991, 11. 1-7. Van subsequently sent an email to 
McCarty and other crew members, inviting them to go to the safety meeting that Humphrey said would 
be held. Tr. p. 997, 11. 2-8, p. 998, 11. 19-24. The email also listed five areas of concern that Van had 
related to the safety of the LifeFlightprogram. Tr.p. 1001, 1. 25,p. 1002-1003,p. 1004,11.1-24. Van 
believed that it was his responsibility and right under federal law to send the email to protect his co-
workers from serious injury and/or death. Tr. p. 999, 11. 14-18. 
McCarty considered Van's concerns of snow and ice on the helicopter blades to be valid. Tr. p. 
1677, 11. 2-11. McCarty agreed with the issues Van raised in his letter explaining his concerns on 
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safety. Tr. p. 1678,11.9-15, p. 1680,11. 5-9. McCarty's feeling on the issues Van raised was that Van 
wanted a safe program. Tr. p. 1683,11.4-8. However, Humphrey didn't feel that the issues addressed 
in Van's March 28, 2005 were appropriate for the crew members. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 8-10. When asked why 
Humphrey didn't just have a big meeting to discuss things openly and honestly, Humphrey responded, 
"I can't answer that." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 969, 11. 7-9. 
At the request of Pam Humphrey, Alzola wrote a statement which included the following: 
Mark says he is only concerned by safety. Like the pilots are not concerned about safety. We 
really want to go out and total an aircraft, kill all the crew members and not see our wives, 
parents, children and grandchildren ever again. Besides, when we are out there at 2:00 in the 
morning, I have never looked over to the left seat and seen a mechanic riding there. They are 
home in bed with their families. So who is really making safety happen? Tr. Vol. 1, p. 101,11. 
17-25. 
By March 24,2005, no one in management had approached Van to resolve the incident involving 
Neilsen. Tr. p. 986, 11. 13-20. On that date, Van wrote an email to Audrey Fletcher because he couldn't 
figure out what to do to get back on track with Neilsen. Tr. p. 986, 11-2-8. Van told Fletcher that he 
wanted to have a meeting to patch up relations with Neilsen and get a working relationship again. Tr. 
p. 974, ll. 4-7. Audrey Fletcher inquired about the incident and asked Van who he wanted to have at 
the meeting between him and Neilsen. Van responded that he just wanted to talk with Barry and put 
it behind him. Tr. p. 988,11. 21-25, p. 989, 11. 1-13. 
Humphrey testified that she and Alzola set up the April 1,2005, meeting. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 946, 11. 6-8, 
18-20. Fletcher testified that it was only Van that had approached her about the April 1 ,2005, meeting. 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1171, 11. 3-9. Fletcher verified that Van contacted her to set up the meeting between him 
and Neilsen, so Fletcher then contacted Humphrey regarding setting up the meeting and Humphrey 
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asked to be present for the meeting. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1119,11. 15-24. 
On April 1, 2005, the meeting was held which Van thought was to re-establish a working 
relationship with Neilsen. Tr. p. 1013, 11. 13-19. Van, Humphrey, Alzola and Fletcher were in 
attendance. Van didn't know that Humphrey and Alzola were going to be there. Tr. p. 1013,11.20-25, 
p. 1014, 1.1. Van started off by talking to Neilsen about the threat and why Neilsen was mad at Van. 
A discussion was held about the word "negligent" and Neilsen became very angry. Tr. p. 1014, ll. 4-12. 
Van asked Neilsen to explain how he knew there wasn't ice on the blades and Neilsen told him, "let 
me explain it so that even you can understand it." Tr. p. 1014, 11. 12-15. Neilsen also made the 
statement that mechanics were just pilot helpers. Tr. p. 1015, 11. 3-4. 
Regarding the April 1 meeting, Neilsen was asked if Van had asked him how he could tell whether 
there was snow and ice on the blades. Neilsen responded, "He may have, yes." Then Neilsen was 
asked if he had responded to Van by stating, "let me explain it so even you can understand." Neilsen 
responded, "I may have." Then Neilsen was asked ifhe thought that statement was condescending. 
Neilsen responded, "It may have been a little bit." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 592, 11. 22-25, p. 593, ll. 1-5. 
Neilsen did state in the April 1 meeting that he probably shouldn't have approached Van when he 
was so angry. Tr. p. 1014, ll. 23-25. That was the only statement of Neilsen that Van remembered even 
coming close to being an apology. Tr. p. 1015, 11. 1-2. Van stated in the meeting that Neilsen had no 
right to be mad at him, and Fletcher responded that Barry had every right. Tr. p. 1020,11.2-3. 
In the meeting, Audrey Fletcher let Neilsen be condescending and talk down to Van. Tr. p. 1004, 
ll. 10-13. She didn't stop anybody from saying whatever they wanted to. Comments were made that 
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it was none of Van's business what discipline action was taken against anybody. Tr. p. 1015,11. 10-17. 
In response to a question by Fletcher, Van said that he didn't want to see another accident. Alzola then 
yelled, "so you think 1 want to see another accident." Tr. p. 1016,11. 1-4. Alzola then got out of his 
chair, stomped out of the room and slammed the door. Tr. p. 1016,11. 4-5. 
Alzola recalled being very angry in the April, 2005 meeting with Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 64, 11. 4-8, 23-
25, p. 65, 1.1. Fletcher acknowledged that Alzola got upset and basically stormed out. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
376,11. 18-23. Fletcher, however, didn't interview the pilots with regard to Mr. Alzola's actions. Tr. 
Vol. 1, p. 377, 11. 15-17. 
Van received no assurance that the threat by Neilsen wouldn't happen again. Tr. p. 1016, n. 11-13. 
Van felt there was no reassurance whatsoever that anybody was held accountable for their actions. Tr. 
p. 1016,11. 17-19. Fletcher confirmed her deposition testimony that, "I believe that Barry Neilsen's 
behavior and the flight pad that day, by his O\vn admission was unacceptable, and it was a form of 
harassment .... " Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1184,11.4-15. However, Fletcher didn't think that Neilsen was ever 
written up. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1186, n. 5-8. 
13. Mark Van's Termination 
At the end of the April 1 meeting, Fletcher said to Van that ifhe had any problem with the meeting 
that he could contact her and they could go over it. Tr. p. 1023,11. 7-10. Van pondered the issues and 
decided that he didn't think there was any closure to the issue between him and Neilsen. Van then sent 
an email requesting a meeting with Fletcher for April 7, 2005. Van informed Fletcher that he had a big 
inspection coming up, as well as a night vision goggle certification process and that it would be April 
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20 before he could meet with Fletcher. Tr. p. 1023,11. 14-17. He never heard back from Fletcher. Tr. 
p. 1022,11. 11-13. Fletcher admitted that she received the April 7,2005 email fromVan.Tr. Vol. 1, 
p. 366, 11. 19-25. Fletcher didn't try to meet with Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 367, 11. 4-5. 
After hearing nothing, Van requested a meeting with Fletcher again on April 19, 2005. Tr. p. 1024, 
11. 18-25, p. 125,11. 1-10. Fletcher testified that by then the decision had been made to terminate Van. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 369, 11. 21-25, p. 370, 11. 1-7. 
Van was terminated from his employment on April 20, 2005. Tr. p. 1022,11. 13-14. Van got a call 
from Pam Humphrey indicating that she had an HR meeting that Van had to come to. Tr. p. 1030, 11. 
15-19. Humphrey wouldn't tell him what the meeting was about. Tr. p. 1030,11. 19-21. Van 
responded that she should tell him what the meeting was about so he could prepare for it. He also 
indicated that he had worked long and hard and that he was not going back into the office that day. Tr. 
p. 1030, 11. 22-25. 
Pam Humphrey called Van back a little later and tried to get Van to come in again. Then Dale 
Mapes of Human Resources called Van and told him that the hospital was exercising its right to 
terminate Van. Tr. p. 1031,11. 5-6, 18-23. Van was shocked and stunned. Tr. p. 1032,11. 13-16. 
Van's termination letter included the basis for his termination, as follows: 
This is to inform you that Portneuf Medical Center has exercised its right to terminate your 
employment effective today. This decision is based on your inability to maintain positive 
interpersonal relations with your colleagues and foster a positive team environment. Tr. p. 
1033,11.2-7. 
Van believed that the hospital terminated him because Alzola, Fergie and Neilsen were upset that 
Van had reported the situation with ice on the blades and the threat. Tr. p. 1035, 11. 8-12. According 
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to Van, they weren't going to put up with being told by a mechanic that they were being unsafe, 
breaking laws or violating Van's rights under federal or state law. Tr. p. 1035, 11. 22-25. Van had 
informed LifeFlight members when the aircraft would be out of service. He felt that once they knew 
maintenance was done, they terminated him. Tr. p. 1052, 11. 8-20. 
As CEO ofthe hospital, Pat Hermansen was responsible for the entire operation and enterprise. He 
required that before anybody was terminated from the hospital, the termination was personally reviewed 
by him before it took place. Tr. p. 409, 11. 8-13. He indicated that if they were going to terminate 
somebody, they better have a good reason and documentation to make that happen. Tr. p. 409, 11. 23-25. 
And yet, Hermansen didn't recall Pam Humphrey mentioning Van's statement that a threat was made 
against him by Neilsen. Tr. p. 454, 11. 5-10. He didn't recall Pam Humphrey indicating to him that there 
were issues with regard to snow and ice on the helicopter. Tr. p. 454, 11. 11-14. Hermansen didn't 
know if Van actually went through a progressive disciplinary process or whether he was given a 
performance improvement plan. Tr. p. 457, 11. 2-9. 
Hermansen desired to protect the employee in each termination decision but actually had no idea 
when he had last spoken with Van prior to the termination. Tr. p. 457, 11. 15-25, p. 458, 1. 1. Regarding 
the information he received from Humphrey, she never indicated that the pilots were responsible for 
any friction that was occurring. Tr. p. 460, 11. 9-13. Hermansen never looked at Van's previous annual 
reviews and ratings. Tr. p. 480, 11. 9-10. He didn't know if Van was interviewed before he was 
terminated. Tr. p. 483, 11. 19-2l. 
Fletcher admitted that she did not provide Dale Mapes with a summary of her investigative findings 
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with her recommendation for tennination. She did not provide notes of her interviews with the pilots 
to Mapes, and that the lengthy conversation that she had with Mapes regarding Van's tennination was 
not documented. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 447, 11. 15-25, p. 448, 11. 1-10. 
14. Pretext 
At trial, Humphrey gave the following reasons for Van's tennination: 
... he was unable or unwilling to accept resolution to any ofthe issues that he brought up. And 
the continued lack of trust for myself, administration, the pilots, resulted in a less than 
desirable relationship. And simply, at that point, his behavior was no longer really necessary. 
And so he was tenninated. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 958, 11. 16-24. 
Given the issues he had to raise, Van felt that he fostered a positive team environment during his 
last four years at the hospital. Tr. p. 1092, ll. 13-19. He testified that he did the best he could with what 
he was working with. Tr. p. 1087, 11. 13-16. Van took personal responsibility for creating and 
maintaining a secure and trusting environment. He believed he had to raise issues that called people's 
trust into issue, but it was the only way to resolve the issue. Tr. p. 1111,11. 23-25, p. 1112,1-6. 
Van never stated in an email ora letter that he didn't trust pilots. Tr.p.1328,11. 4-7. He did not 
want to be confrontational. He didn't want friction. He didn't enjoy it. Tr. p. 1334, 11. 23-25. 
Van testified that there was no way to put out a safety issue that's going to make somebody happy 
when it's about them. "You're going to make people unhappy when you raise safety issues about them, 
period." Tr. p. 1200,11.21-25, p. 1201,11. 11-13. Van further testified: 
I think if you raise safety issues you're going to discredit somebody because they're part of the 
safety issue. You're asking an impossible task to not raise a safety issue and not hurt 
somebody's feelings. This had grown into a large problem, because I couldn't raise safety 
issues in public or to protect my coworkers. Tr. p. 1269,11. 18-24. 
Humphrey testified that Van kept bringing up issues and wouldn't accept anything that was not his 
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own, and yet she couldn't recall a complaint from Van when he didn't get what he asked for in terms 
of additional help. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 319,11.7-22. Humphrey further testified that she never had an 
occasional mechanic come to her and say that he was not going to work because of Van' s attitude. Tr. 
Vol. 1, p. 335, 11.16-19. 
Stoltz never filed a complaint against Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 513, 1. 25, p. 514, 11.1-3. Stoltz confirmed 
his deposition testimony that he had a good working relationship with Van, that he had no 
disagreements with Van, and that Van never asked him to do anything that was inappropriate. Tr. VoL 
1, p. 510,11.23-25, p. 511, 11. 1-14. Stoltz felt that the safety issues Van raised were valid concerns. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 534, 11. 17-19. He also believed that there were, on occasion, alleged violations that made 
it necessary to have safety issues revisited. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 534, 11. 24-25, p. 535, 11. 1-2. 
Greg Vickers didn't raise any complaint about Van because "it hadn't come to that point." Tr. p. 
1575 11. 21-23. McCarty never raised any concern about Van to management and had no reason to do 
so. Tr. p. 1652,11. 21-25. She never considered Van to be a safety risk. Tr. p. 1661,11. 21-23. 
Pilot Waller never found Van to be difficult to work with or uncooperative. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 477,11. 
4-8. Waller trusted Van and never reported Van to anyone in LifeFlight management. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
477,11.9-15. Waller testified that Van never told him that pilots were lazy. Tr. Vol. 1, p.466, 11. 15-19. 
Pilot Neilsen trusted Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 573, 11. 1-8. Fergie never wanted Van terminated. Tr. Vol. 
1, p. 706, 1. 16. Fletcher testified that Van was never rude or negative with her. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1193, 11. 
8-10. Defendant's expert, James Wisecup, did not find or review any documentation indicating that Mr. 
Van shouted at anyone during his employment. Tr. p. 1438,11. 18-22. Wisecup could not recall seeing 
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any email that Van wrote that was threatening. Tr.p. 1469,11. 24-25,p. 1470,11. 1-2. 
Program Director Roberts trusted Van with his life and did not see any changes in Van's job 
performance after the accident. Tr. p. 690, 11. 15-19. Roberts never saw Van bully or belittle anyone 
at LifeFlight unless somebody said something that was kind of belittling to him. Tr. p. 723, 11. 7-9. 
Chief Flight Nurse Tom Mortimer testified that he trusted Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 219, 11. 6-7. Mortimer 
believed that Van was genuinely concerned about safety. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 226, 11. 6-7. 
Lance Taysom felt comfortable and never had any problem with Van. He never felt that Van didn't 
trust him. Tr. p. 1528, 11. 11-17. Flight nurse/paramedic Mark Romero never raised any complaints 
about Van, he trusted him as much as he trusted the pilots. Tr. p. 1634,11. 21-25, p. 1635,1. 1. 
Van was never told by anyone at the hospital that ifhe didn't improve his behavior, he would be 
terminated. He never received any written warnings or disciplinary action. Tr. p. 1037, 11. 5-13. 
Humphrey testified that in 2005, she did not tell Van to change his behavior or he would be terminated. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 246, 11. 23-25, p. 247, 1. 1. Humphrey didn't recall ever giving Van written discipline. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 247, ll. 7-11. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 247, 11. 21-24. Fletcher confirmed that there was no fitness 
for duty evaluation completed for Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 398, 11. 6-9. Fletcher knew of no aggressive 
disciplinary process that Pam Humphrey started for Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 400, 11. 19-21. 
Humphrey gave Van an overall score of3.03 on Van's performance evaluation of January 14.2005. 
She considered the score to be respectable. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 253, 11. 22-25, p. 254, 11. 1-11. Humphrey 
confirmed that Van received a merit raise based on that evaluation. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 257, 11. 9-11. 
Humphrey signed a merit change of salary for Van on March 31,2005. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 257, 11.18-25. 
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Van received an hourly wage increase of$.70, effective March 20 2005. Tr. p. 1078, ll. 21-25, p. 1079, 
11. 1-14,24-25, p. 1080,1. I.Van had received merit raises in 2002 and 2003. He believed he received 
a merit raise in 2004 as well. Tr. p. 1082, 11. 6-8, p. 1083, 11. 20-25, p. 1085, 11. 8-10. 
In Van's January 2005 performance evaluation, Tr. p. 1069,11. 4-7, Humphrey wrote: 
Mark has been faced with several tough challenges during the past year. A new helicopter, 
increased work load, longer downtime resulting in longer hours worked. Short staffed and 
unresolved past conflicts. I have also seen Mark demonstrate a willingness to assist me with 
getting these issues resolved. I appreciate Mark's efforts in embracing this change and his 
professional manner in his actions. He continues to demonstrate his commitment to incorporate 
the standards of behavior and excellence in his actions. 
On the other hand, Mark can continue to expect that we will have many more challenges to face 
as the medical center looks to moving into one campus. I'm confident and expect that Mark will 
understand those challenges and limitations. Most of all, I appreciate Mark's commitment to 
making our program and aircraft safe. Tr. p. 1076, 11. 19-25, p. 1077, 11. 1-12. 
15. Post-Termination 
Van filed for unemployment, but with two months after his termination, he got ajob so he didn't 
have to go on employment benefits. Tr. p. 1038, 11. 9-19. Shane Palagi, a long-time acquaintance, 
asked him ifhe would come work for him at the A V Center. Tr. p. 1038, 11. 22-24. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues before this Court on Appeal can be summarized as follows: 
1. Was the verdict rendered by the jury based on substantial and competent evidence presented 
at trial? 
2. Was the special verdict rendered by the jury contrary to applicable whistleblower law? 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that certain statements made by Portneuf 
employees were inadmissable hearsay? 
4. Did the trial Court commit reversible error by prohibiting Plaintiffto cross examine Defendant's 
expert regarding certain information? 
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5. Did the trial court commit reversible error with regard to his handling of certain evidence 
pertaining to federal statutes and regulations? 
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing Defendant to introduce evidence of 
emails that Plaintiff sent to Defendant's former and current employees in 2009, years after Plaintiff was 
terminated? 
7. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that remedies provided under §§6-2105 and 
6-2106 ofthe Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act do not include damages for pain and suffering 
and front pay. 
8. Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the provocation of the 
employee's while reporting protected activity? 
9. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to give a jury instruction pertaining to the 
spoliation of evidence? 
10. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs? 
11. Is Van entitled to attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to I.e. §6-2106? 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellate Review Over Questions of Law 
A jury verdict on appeal will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 (2011). 
"Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion." Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 17,278 P.3d 415,419 (2012) 
quoting Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003) (citing 
Hughen v. Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002)). 
When reviewing a jury verdict on appeal, the evidence presented at trial is construed in a light most 
favorable to the party who prevailed at trial. Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 112 
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Idaho 722, 726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987). 
Matters of First Impression 
When confronted with matters of first impression which involve Idaho statutes, the Court may gain 
insight from the interpretations of sister states concerning similar or identical statutes. Curlee v. 
Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d 458,463 (2008). 
Statutory Interpretation 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Curlee, 148 Idaho at 398, 224 P.3d at 465 citing State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850,852 
(2001). In construing a statute, this Court will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the 
legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the 
provisions. !d., citing George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537,539-40,797 P.2d 1385, 
1387-88 (1990). 
Abuse of Discretion 
When a court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court considers "(I) 
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) and whether the trial court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 29, 13 P.3d 857, 860, (2000) citing Sun 
Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
Harmless and Reversible Error 
The court, at every state of the proceeding, must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
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which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. LR.C.P.61. This rule provides as follows: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling 
or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for 
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifYing, or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
It is not sufficient for an appellant to show abridgement of a substantial right; rather, the appellant 
also must show that if the error had not occurred, "a different result would have been probable." 
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 733 P .2d 781, 112 Idaho 560 ( Ct. App. 1986) citing Soria v. Sierra Pacific 
Airlines, 111 Idaho 594,608, 726 P.2d 706, 720 (1986). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 103 provides in part: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... 
* * * (c) Hearing of jury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, 
so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as 
making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
d) Errors affecting substantial rights. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain 
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention ofthe court. 
When appealing from an evidentiary ruling reviewed for abused of discretion, the appellant must 
demonstrate that both the trial court's abuse of discretion and that the error affected a substantial right. 
Hurtado, 153 Idaho at 18,278 P.3d at 420. 
Jury Instructions 
The correctness of jury instructions is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. 
The standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have been given, is whether 
there is evidence attrial to support the instruction. Bailey v. Sariford, 139 Idaho 744, 750, 86 P.3d 458, 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF -46-
464, (2004) citing Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho, 154, 156,45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002). 
The jury should be instructed concerning every reasonable claim supported by the pleadings and 
the evidence. Watsonv. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 666, 827 P.2d656, 679 (1992). 
"A requested instruction must be given ifthere is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it." 
Bailey, 139 Idaho at 750,86 P.3d at 464 citing Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority, 
124 Idaho 450, 461-62,860 P.2d 653,664-65 (1993). 
The standard of review for issues concerning jury instructions is limited to a determination of 
whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law. When 
the instructions, taken as a whole, do not mislead or prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does 
not constitute reversible error. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 882,42 P.3d 
672,675 (2002)(citing to Howell v. Eastern Idaho Railroad, Inc., 135 Idaho 733, 24 P.3d 50 (2001)). 
Misleading Conduct by Counsel 
To determine whether a statement by counsel constitutes reversible error, the Court must look 
to the objection raised by opposing counsel and the curative instructions. Bailey, 139 Idaho at 752,86 
P .3d at 466. The allowance of misleading conduct is an error of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. Bailey, 139 Idaho at 751,86 P.3d at 465, citing Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 381, 
3 P.3d 56,59 (Ct. App. 2000), Bouten Construction Co. v. HF Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,992 
P.2d 751 (1999). 
Attorney Fees 
An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to an 
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abuse of discretion standard of review. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104 P .3d 367 (2004): See 
Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). The party disputing the award of 
attorney fees has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. 
Washington Fed Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 525,20 P.3d 702, 709 (2001). The district court's determination 
of a reasonable amount of attorney fees is a factual determination to which this Court applies an abuse 
of discretion standard of review. See State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206 (1999) 
citing Miller v. EchoHawk, 126 Idaho 47,878 P.2d 746 (1994). 
II. 
THE VERDICT RENDERED BY THE JURY WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Under Idaho's Whistleblower Act, a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge requires the plaintiff 
to show: (1) he was an " employee" who engaged or intended to engage in protected activity; (2) his 
" employer" took adverse action against him; and (3) the existence of a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 
558,212 P.3d 982, 988 (2009). 
Once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the defendant is obligated to produce evidence 
which, if taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a non-retaliatory reason for the 
adverse action; and ifthe defendant articulates a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for discharge, then 
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason the 
defendant offers is a pretext for the retaliatory conduct. Curlee, 148 Idaho at 396,224 P.3d at 463. 
The questions on the Special Verdict Form submitted to the jury read as follows: 
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Question No. 1. Did Plaintiff Mark van proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
communicated in good faith the existence of violations or suspected violations oflaws, rules, 
or regulations adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or of the 
United States? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
* * * Question NO.2. Did Plaintiff Mark Van proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
suffered an adverse action? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
* * * QUESTION NO.3. Did Mark Van prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Portneuf 
Medical Center terminated his employment because he communicated to Portneuf Medical 
Center, in good faith, violations or suspected violations of laws, rules, or regulations adopted 
under the law of this state, a political subdivision of the state, or of the United States, and that 
PortneufMedical Center's reason for terminating Mr. Van was not believable or that it was not 
the true reason? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
R. Vol. III, pp. 531-532. 
The jury answered the first two questions "yes" and the third question "no". R. Vol. III, pp. 531-
532. Therefore, the first issue presented is whether the jury's finding that Van failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the hospital terminated his employment because he reported protected 
activity in good faith is supported by substantial and competent evidence. The second issue is whether 
the jury's finding that Van failed to prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the hospital's reason 
for terminating Mr. Van was not believable or was not the true reason. Appellant asserts that for the 
reasons set forth below, the jury's findings are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
The Jury's Findings are Unsupported Because Portneuf Did Not Establish by Substantial and 
Competent Evidence That It Terminated Mark Van For A Legitimate Reason 
During trial, there were only two proffered reasons for Van's termination, Van's assertion that the 
hospital ended his employment because he communicated, in good faith, violations or suspected 
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violations of laws, rules, or regulations adopted under the law, and the hospital's claim that it 
terminated Van based on his "inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with [his ]co11eagues 
and foster a positive team environment." Tr. p. 1033,11.2-7. 
The online Merriam-Webster definition of "whistle blower" is "one who reveals something covert 
or who informs against another." http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/whistleblower.As 
indicated below, one who informs against another does not foster a positive team environment: 
To mobsters, he is a 'rat'; to drug dealers, a 'snitch.' To school children, he is a 'tattletale'; to 
corporate executives, a 'whistle-blower.' To cops, he is an 'informant'; to prosecutors, a 
'cooperator.' By whatever name he is known, the person who betrays his associates to the 
authorities is almost universally reviled. In movies, on television, in literature, the cooperator 
embodies all that society holds in contempt: he is disloyal, deceitful, greedy, selfish, and weak. 
United States v. Carmichael, 326 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2004) citing Michael A. Simons, 
Retributionfor Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, andAtonement, 56 Vand. L.Rev. 1,2 (2003). See also, 
United States v. General Elec., 808 F.Supp. 580,584 (S.D.Ohio 1992)(U.S. Sixth District Court noted, 
"No one likes 'snitches,' but they can be valuable." Court also noted that the Department of Justice has 
considered such individuals as adversaries rather than allies and the reason continues to be unknown, 
but the attitude is clear.) 
A study performed on whistleblowers found in part: 
Overall, it became clear through the interviews that whistleblowers are in the ultimate no-win 
situation. By speaking out they face the wrath of managers for being a squealer, but inaction 
makes them potentially culpable and/or easy scapegoats when and if the misconduct is 
discovered. 
* * * [W]histle-blowers - even where their disclosures are found to be true and of great benefit to the 
employer - still face significant risk of various types of organizational retaliation, such as 
ostracism by co-workers, long term economic harm, and psychological injury. 
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* * * 
As a consequence oftheir whistle-blowing experience, the majority of the whistle-blowers in 
our sample suffered intensely. The most common fallout from their whistle-blowing involved: 
(a) severe depression or anxiety (84%), (b) feelings of isolation or powerlessness (84%) (c) 
distrust of others (78% ), (d) declining physical health, (e) severe financial decline (66%) and 
(f) problems with family relations (53%). Repeatedly, respondents mentioned that whistle-
blowing undermined their trust in others. These numbers are extremely high; however, the 
numbers cannot convey the emotional distress that we heard from so many of our respondents. 
Joyce Rothschild, Terance D Meithe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management Retaliation: 
The Battle to Control Information About Organizational Corruption, 26 Work and Occupations, No. 
1, 119-121(February 1999). 
According to Pam Humphrey, Van was not able to get along, he was always causing problems, and 
he had a continued lack of trust for herself, the administration, and the pilots. These perceptions fall 
squarely within the studied traits of a whistle blower as indicated above. Construing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to Portneuf, Humphrey's own perceptions about Van indicate that he was fired for 
being a whistleblower. 
Portneufs proffered reasons for the termination of Van actually constitute the embodiment of a 
whistleblower. The inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with colleagues and to foster 
a positive team environment cannot be a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for discharge, because 
whistle-blowing, by definition, pits one person against another. Portneuf presented no substantial and 
competent evidence to justifY a basis for termination that is not whistle-blower related. The jury could 
not reach its findings based on substantial and competent evidence because no such evidence exists. 
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The Jury's Findings are Unsupported Because Van Would Not Have Been SUbjected to the Same 
Disciplinary Action If He Had Not Engaged in the Protected Activity 
At the time of the October 30th/31st 2004 incident, Van engaged in protected activity by reporting 
a suspected violation of a regulation pertaining to the helicopter flying with snow and ice on the rotor 
blades. Van's discovery of snow and ice under the rotor blade covers on February 1, 2005, established 
that the issue of snow and ice had not been resolved. Van, in good faith, believed that the problem had 
not resolved. He was therefore entitled to raise past snow and ice issues again. The evidence clearly 
shows that Van's efforts to address the snow and ice issues were made in good faith. 
Once Van reported the February 1 incident, emails were exchanged between Alzola and Van 
regarding the issue of snow and ice and the authority necessary to determine the helicopter unairworthy. 
Van's emailstoAlzolawerewrongfullysharedwithFergie.NeilsenandMortimer.This led to 
Neilsen's angry confrontation with Van on the helipad. Subsequently, meetings were held, 
investigations were performed and Van was terminated. This sequence of events thus leads to the 
conclusion that had Van not reported a suspected violation in 2004, as well as an incident of snow and 
ice under the blade covers in 2005, efforts to terminate him would not have occurred. 
Van never received any formal disciplinary actions. He was never given a performance 
improvement plan or a fitness for duty evaluation for behavior issues. He was given satisfactory 
performance evaluations and even received a merit raise just before he was terminated. Portneuf simply 
cannot separate its motives for imposing discipline upon Van from Van's reported activity. Therefore 
the reasons given for Van's termination are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Without such evidence, the jury's findings are also lacking of such support. 
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III. 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT RENDERED BY THE JURY WAS CONTRARY TO 
APPLICABLE WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 
The Idaho Legislature enacted the Protection of Public Employees Act with the following intent: 
The legislature hereby finds, determines and declares that government constitutes a large 
proportion of the Idaho work force and that it is beneficial to the citizens of this state to protect 
the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for public employees who 
experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of 
a law, rule or regulation. 
As indicated above, Idaho's Whistleblower Act was designed to protect the integrity of government 
by establishing a deterrent for retaliation against whistle-blowers. The premise that the very nature of 
whistle-blowing doesn't promote organizational unity must also be taken into consideration here. If 
governmental entities are left free to terminate whistle-blowers because of the discord arising from 
protected activity, the purposes of the Whistleblower Act will not be fulfilled because the deterrent will 
become meaningless. Labeling a whistleblower disloyal absolutely contrary to the Legislature's intent. 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY RULING THAT 
CERTAIN STATEMENTS BY PORTNEUF EMPLOYEES WERE INADMISSIBLE 
HEARSAY 
During the direct examination of Gordon Roberts in Van's case in chief, Roberts was questioned 
whether he was requested to approach Pam Humphrey about her actions regarding Donna Favor 
[Favor]. Tr. p. 669, 11. 2-4. Roberts began stating that his boss, Emily Davidson-Taylor, said that she 
felt like Pam Humphrey was retaliating. Tr. p. 669, 11. 5-7. Before Roberts finished his sentence, 
Defendant's counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay. The objection was immediately sustained by 
the court before Plaintiff s counsel had an opportunity to respond. 
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Plaintiff's counsel subsequently argued that the statement was an admission by a party opponent 
with regard to Pam Humphrey. Tr. p. 669,11. 10-14. Defendant's counsel then argued that Humphrey 
was not a party. Tr. p. 669, 11. 16-17. Plaintiff's counsel argued supplied additional argument and the 
court responded as follows: 
MR. NIELSON; Well, Your Honor, it's my understanding that Pam Holmes [Humphrey], 
because she was a director, certainly was a party, because the defendant, Portneuf Medical 
Center, is made up of its employees. They are the party here. I cannot ask Portneuf Medical 
Center specific questions or direct negative statements or anything like that to PortneufMedical 
Center. I have to go to the direct individuals involved. 
THE COURT: I think you can ask him what he understood he was to do after he spoke with his 
boss, but I'm not going to let direct statements come in. So the objection is sustained. Tr. p. 
669, 11. 20-25, p. 670, 11. 1-6. 
Later in Roberts' testimony, the court again sustained Defendant's hearsay objection to Roberts' 
indicating what Ms. Davidson had asked him on a particular issue regarding Humpp.rey. Tr. p. 670, 11. 
20-25. 
Roberts was asked by Plaintiff's counsel if Van had ever indicated that Alzola asked Van to take 
responsibility, to buck up. Tr. p. 688, 11. 7-8. Roberts said that Alzola came to see him and Roberts was 
trying to talk to Alzola about doing something for Van to help him out. Tr. p. 688, 11. 9-12. Roberts 
started to say, "Gary Alzola told me- ", when Defendant's counsel objected without stating a basis for 
the objection, and the court sustained the objection. Tr. p. 688, 11. 9-14. 
On February 1,2011, after the court had ruled that employee statements were hearsay. Plaintiff's 
counsel specifically addressed LR.E. 801 (d)(2) with the court. Counsel stated: 
MR. NIELSON : Yes, Your Honor. I would like to address the issue of Rule of Evidence 801 (d), 
or 2D I guess it is, admission by a party opponent. It was my recollection, Your Honor that by 
the time we got done with the hearing, or the trial, on Friday, there were basically no statements 
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coming in from Portneuf employees[,] that an admission by a party opponent was effectively 
obliterated for my client. Tr. p. 743, ll. 4-11. 
Plaintiff's counsel further argued that out-of-court statements by Humphrey, Hermanson, Alzola 
Ron Fergie were not hearsay, because they held managerial positions and out-of-court statements by 
hospital employees should also be treated as admissions by the party-opponent. Defendant's counsel 
argued that the court's ruling on the issue should be upheld. Tr. p. 743, 11. 12-25, p. 744, ll. 1-21, p. 
745,11.9-10. The court responded as follows: 
THE COURT: Okay, I appreciate you bringing this to my attention, Mr. Nielson. What I'll 
simply say is to continue trying your case as you would. Mr. McFarlane will make his 
objections and I'll consider the rule as you've quoted it to me and make a decision as we go 
with regard to whether or not individuals are party opponents are not. So we'll just proceed 
from there. I appreciate you bringing it to my attention and I'll consider that. Tr. p. 745, ll. 13-
21. 
Thus, the court failed correct the issue or provide any guidance to counsel whatsoever on how to 
treat out-of-court statements by hospital employees. 
During Van's testimony, he referred to a conversation between Fergie and mechanic Greg Stoltz 
regarding ice and snow on the helicopter's rotor blades. Tr. p. 896, 11. 3-10. Defendant's counsel 
objected to Van's statement as hearsay within hearsay. The court informed Plaintiff's counsel that 
Stoltz was not a party opponent and counsel replied that he was a servant, an employee. The court 
responded that Stoltz was not in any supervisory role and sustained the hearsay objection. Plaintiff's 
counsel then raised his continuing objection to the court's ruling. Tr. p. 896. 11. 11-25. 
On February 1,2011, Van began testifYing about what Waller had told him concerning wiping the 
blade covers the night before Van snow under the rotor blade covers on February 1,2005. Defendant's 
counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay and the court sustained the objection before Plaintiff's 
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counsel could argue. Plaintiff's counsel then argued that it was not hearsay under the admission by a 
party opponent rule and yet the court sustained the objection. Tr. p. 924, 11. 23-25, p. 925, 11. 1-7. 
At the end of the trial day on February 1, the court addressed its hearsay rulings: 
THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the record in Van versus PMC. This is outside the 
presence of the jury. Before we look at the compensatory damages issue, Mr. Nielson and Mr. 
McFarlane, I want to go back to my - our disagreement, Mr. Nielson, with regard to hearsay. 
Sometimes I have to look at things and look at things and look at things. 
I think, in terms of some of these individuals that you were asking to have Mr. Van testifY as 
to what they said, I recognize that they are employees. As long as the statements that they're 
making are within the scope of their employment and in some way - not in some way, but 
pertain to the issue that we have in this case, as far as violations of safety issues, I can see where 
that would be - that wouldn't be hearsay. 
So, for example, one of the last ones with regards to the one helicopter pilot, I think Fergie, but 
I think I should not have sustained the objection, should have allowed Mr. Van to testifY as to 
what he was - what the pilot said based on the fact that that was within the scope of his 
employment concerning safety issues that are at stake in this trial. 
So, I'll try and keep that in mind with regard to that as the trial progresses. If you want to go 
back and ask more questions of Mr. Van with regard to some of those statements that I did not 
allow in, I certainly will allow you to do that. I think that quite frankly, I was wrong, is what I'm 
trying to say in that regard. Looking at it in those terms maybe helps me to understand the 
hearsay rule a little bit better and that's how I would rule from here on out with regard to that. 
I think that is pretty much what you've been trying to tell me, but I guess - what you've been 
trying to tell me I just haven't been able to - wasn't processing the way it made sense to me, 
until I looked at another case here. So I guess that's where I'm at on that. 
If you need to go back and elicit some additional testimony from Mr. Van, you certainly can. 
Then we can address any objections that Mr. McFarlane has at that time. But just so you both 
know that's my mind set with regard to that objection now. Tr. p. 928,11. 11-25, p. 929, p. 930, 
11. 1-4. 
During redirect examination of Van on February 4, Van was responding to a follow-up question 
relating to a topic addressed by Defendant's counsel in cross-examination. Van began stating what Kirk 
Cornelius, one of the LifeFlight pilots, told him. Defendant's counsel again objected on the grounds 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF -56-
of hearsay and the court sustained the objection. Tr. p. 1316,11.3-6, p. 1359,11. 10-25. 
What little the court did provide in form of curative directions were simply too little too late and 
were then later ignored by the court. The court abused its discretion by refusing to admit admission by 
part opponent statements from hospital employees in Van's case in chief. Van was denied his right 
to fully present his case as allowed by the Rules of Evidence. Instead, Van was forced to invent 
methods to get the message out without actually stating what the hospital employee had said. 
At trial, a whistleblower's right to provide relevant statements from other employees is absolutely 
necessary. Van's ability to state what other employees had said pertaining to relevant issues was crucial 
to his case. The court's unorthodox methods of not allowing admissions by party opponents interrupted 
the flow of evidence. Van's restrictions on what he could and could not say in this regard in essence 
caused a chilling effect on his efforts to provide testimony. In sum, had Van been able to freely express 
what the pilots and administration were saying, his case would not have been so riddled with holes, 
objections and interruptions. A different result would likely have been reached. 
V. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF EMAILS PLAINTIFF SENT TO 
FORMER AND CURRENT EMPLOYEES IN 2009 
Plaintiff s counsel sought the exclusion of Exhibit 320 and other related exhibits which were emails 
Van sent to Defendant's employees in January, 2009. Tr. p. 391, 11.8-10, p. 394, 11.19-24. The emails 
contained a newspaper photo of Neilsen removing snow and ice from the helicopter with various 
captions inserted by Van. Plaintiff s counsel argued that the emails were irrelevant, that their prejudicial 
affect outweighed their probative value, that they were too far removed from Van's termination and that 
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they did not pertain to the tennination whatsoever. Tr. p. 392, 11. 2-6, p. 397, 11. 3-5. Defendant's 
counsel argued that the emails showed Van's continued pattern of distrust and antagonism towards the 
people he worked with. Tr. p. 395, 11. 7-9. 
The court indicated that it had let in evidence substantially prior to Van's tennination, that it 
questioned the relevance of some ofthe early events that has been discussed, and that it detennined that 
the emails had some relevance to Defendant's defense. The court then denied Plaintiff's Motion. Tr. 
397,11.9-25, p. 398, 11. 1-10. The court ruled that it would hear Plaintiff's objections to each email as 
the Defendant seeks to have each admitted. Tr. p. 398, 11. 12-16. 
When Defendant's counsel sought the admission of one of the referenced emaiis, Exhibit 320, 
through CEO Pat Hennansen, the court addressed Plaintiff's counsel and asked, "NIr. Nielson, a 
continuing objection with regard to this document? Plaintiff's counsel answered "Yes" and the court 
stated: All right. Mr. Nielson, your objection is noted and it continues with regard to this document. 
The court will overrule the objection and admit defendant's exhibit 320." Tr. p. 435, 11. 10-18. 
LR.E. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the detennination ofthe action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. While the emails did indicate Van's attitude towards what was 
depicted in the newspaper photo, the emails had absolutely no direct relevance to Portneuf's basis for 
tenninating Van. 
By detennining that the emails had some relevance, the court in essence gave the jury the burden 
of detennining whether the attitude that Van exhibited through the emails bolstered Portneuf's basis 
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for termination. However, the court did not provide the jury with evidence regarding the substantial 
battles that had occurred in Van's federal and state court litigation and all the issues that had arisen in 
discovery. Too many circumstances had occurred during the four year period between termination and 
the emails for the court to determine that the emails had "some relevance" to Van's termination. 
I.R.E. 403 provides that evidence may be excluded ifits probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The prejudice to Van 
resulting from the admission of the evidence far outweighed the relevance, if any, of the emails. 
Through the admission of the evidence, Portneufs objectives of turning the jury against Van were 
further achieved. The court abused its discretion by leading the jury to believe that acts performed four 
years after the termination were still relevant to the termination. The ruling did not assist the jury in 
making findings based on relevant evidence. Such abuse of discretion adversely affected Van's right 
to have only relevant evidence presented to the jury pursuant to the Rules of Evidence. 
VI. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT 
REMEDIES PROVIDED UNDER THE IDAHO PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
ACT DO NOT INCLUDE DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING 
Plaintiff attempted to call Michael Stevens, a licensed counselor, as a witness. Tr. p. 564,11. 18-
21. Defendant's counsel initially moved to exclude Stevens' testimony to the extent that he was not 
qualified to testifY as to whether Van had PTSD on the grounds that Stevens was a MSW and not a 
psychologist or psychiatrist. Tr. p. 565,11. 18-25. The court then repeatedly supplied information to 
Defendant's counsel so that counsel could bolster his objection: 
MR. MCFARLANE: Correct, the second letter addressed in 2008 doesn't say anything that Mr. 
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Van can't say himself. This is the one where Mr. Stevens, and I haven't gone over it lately, but-
THE COURT: I'm somewhat concerned, Mr. McFarlane, that the letters mix issues with regard 
to the litigation and the 2001 incident. I think that that's a concern of mine. 
MR. MCFARLANE: That's correct, Your Honor. In fact, most ofthe litigation - the stressors 
involved and cited to Mr. Van refer to the litigation and not the incident in 2001. I think that 
when you look at Mr. Steven's notes, assuming he's cross-examined on his notes, if you look 
at his reports, the discussion with Mr. Van all revolve around the litigation process. 
THE COURT: So you're concerned more aboutthe prejudicial value versus the probative effect 
ofthis testimony? 
MR. MCFARLANE: That's correct, Your Honor. The problem is that it's very prejudicial. And 
in essence, if you look at the language ofthe reports, he's essentially just arguing for Mr. Van 
like a lawyer wood. 
THE COURT: Do you have any concerns about how, if any, this would - his testimony would 
assist the jury? 
MR. MCFARLANE: I don't think it would assist the jury under Rule 702. 702, as the court is 
aware, provides that if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testity thereto in the form of opinion 
or otherwise. 
I don't think that what Mr. Stevens has to say will help the jury in any way. He's not able to 
diagnose him with post-traumatic stress syndrome. In facts, he says he thinks he may have a 
couple of factors of the criteria, but he can't say that he has it, can't say that he ever had it. 
THE COURT: But you don't believe he's even qualified to diagnose? 
MR. MCFARLANE: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay, Well, I'll hear from you, Mr. Nielson, but first I want to have Mr. Stevens 
come up and put him under oath and I have some questions with regard to his qualifications as 
an expert. Tr. p. 566,11. 11-25, p. 567, p. 568,11. 1-9. 
In response to questions from Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Stevens indicated that he could take out the 
litigation aspect and still be able to testity with regard to the effect upon Mr. Van from the 2001 
accident and the effects upon Mr. Van from his termination. Tr. p. 573,11. 13-23. Stevens had made 
diagnoses of PTSD many, many times. Tr. p. 574, 11, 7-9. Steven diagnosed that Van suffered 
depression and anxiety from his termination. Stevens felt that it would be helpful to the jury to hear 
the diagnoses. Tr. p. 576.11.6-19. 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF -60-
After questioning Stevens, Plaintiff's counsel argued that it was critical for Mr. Van's case with 
regard to pain and suffering that Stevens testifY. Tr. p. 578,11. 578, 11. 10-12. The court then directed 
counsel in a discussion of whether pain and suffering damages are allowable under Idaho Code §6-
2106. Tr. p. 578,11.13-25, pp. 579-582, p. 583, 11.1-3. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued that §6-2105 had to be considered in conjunction with §6-2106. Tr. p. 
583,11.4-7. The court determined that counsel should look at the issue and that until such time as the 
issue was decided, Steven's testimony would be very limited. Tr. p. 584,11.4-14. The court said that 
it wouldn't let Stevens testifY anything aboutthe termination or post-termination. Tr. p. 584, 11. 14-16. 
Plaintiffs counsel determined to hold off calling Stevens until the issue was briefed. Tr. p. 585,11. 4-6. 
Apparently confused, the court initially expressed the opinion that testimony regarding pain and 
suffering from the termination was not relevant, and even that the termination was not relevant. The 
dialogue between court and counsel regarding pain and suffering damages then went as follows: 
MR. MCFARLANE: What we haven't addressed is what might happen ifthe court determines 
that pain and suffering is an element of damages in this case and then we're back to where we 
were when the court mentioned the statute, which is this co-mingling and how to deal with that. 
I think once we get beyond this - we'll have to readdress that once we've gotten beyond the 
statutory hurdle. 
THE COURT: If I were to find that pain and suffering is a part of damages that can be 
requested by the plaintiff, Mr. Stevens's testimony, again, would still be limited to the 2001 
incident. Nothing more than that. I'd be very- go ahead, Mr. Nielson. 
MR. NIELSON: Well, Your Honor, wouldn't it be limited to - wouldn't it be also to the 
termination? 
THE COURT: Post-termination I don't think has a relevance in this case because I think that 
goes to - I'm very concerned, Mr. Nielson, about talking about the termination because I'm not 
sure where the relevance is regarding the fact that he was terminated. That's after the fact. 
We're talking about what happened prior to his termination and what - I think what your case 
is about is that his hypervigilance with regard to safety and not being responded to created 
stressors in his life and anxiety because he didn't believe that his concerns were being address 
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appropriately. And because ofthat it created friction and that he was then terminated because 
he reported these incidents and they weren't satisfactorily - nothing was done. He did it in good 
faith, but as a consequence he was terminated because of his reporting of those incidents. I'm 
not sure that anything - if Mr. Stevens can testifY with regard to prior to his termination, and 
the anxiety with regard to that, I would probably let that come in, but that's not what I heard 
from Mr. Stevens. I heard you ask him questions about post-termination stuff 
MR. NIELSON: Yes. And I respectfully disagree that in terms that the statute - it's my 
understanding that the employer cannot take an adverse action against an employee for 
reporting violations. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. NIELSON: So my understanding and belief is that the termination itself was an adverse 
action under the statute. It should be included with all ofthe other actions that took place that 
were wrongfully leading up to the termination. And that in terms of inclusion there, pain and 
suffering would be appropriate to address with regard to the wrongful termination also. 
THE COURT: That's something I'll have to think about. Mr. McFarlane, you bring up a good 
point. I'll think about that Mr. Nielson. Obviously there is a difference there. I haven't given 
it that much thought, to be honest with you, to be able to give you a straight answer right now. 
Tr. p. 586,11. 5-25, p. 587, p. 588,11. 1-8. 
At the conclusion of February 1 trial day, the court addressed the arguments and briefing of the 
parties' counsel on the issue of whether pain and suffering damages were contemplated by the Idaho 
Whistleblower statute. Tr. p. 930, 6-11. Plaintiff's counsel argued that Idaho Code §6-2106 addresses 
compensation for losses, but does not address compensation for injury and that I. C. §6-21 05 addresses 
injury and losses. Counsel argued that the court needed to treat §6-21 05 with as much emphasis as §6-
2106 and that it needed to focus on the language that indicates that damages means damages for injury. 
Tr. p. 930, 11.15-25, p. 931, 11. 1-11. After hearing additional argument from both parties, the court 
concluded that I. C. §6-21 05 allows for actual damages, §6-21 06 defines what those damages could be, 
and §6-2106 did not include compensatory damages such as pain and suffering. Tr. p. 937, 11. 11-15. 
Idaho Code §6-2105 provides in part: 
Remedies for employee bringing action--Proof required. (1) As used in this section, "damages" 
means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter, and includes court 
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costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for appropriate 
injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within one hundred eighty (180) days after the 
occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from the above usage of the word "or" in §6-21 05, that the term "loss" was not meant to 
be redundant of the term "injury". 
The remedies set forth in §6-2106 are as follows: 
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of this act; 
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the adverse action, or 
to an equivalent position; 
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights; 
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration; 
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees; 
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), which shall be 
submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the general fund. 
The Whistleblower Act does not provide a definition for the word "injury". However, State v. 
Mead, 145 Idaho 378, 381, 179 P .3d 341, 344 (Ct. App. 2008), is instructive on the definition of 
"injury". Finding that the word "injury" was not defined in the criminal code, the Court of Appeals 
turned to Black's Law Dictionary and ruled as follows: 
An injury is "any harm or damage." Blacks Law Dictionary 801 (8 th ed. 2004). A physical or 
bodily injury is "physical damage to a person's body." Id. If the legislature intended any 
meaning other than the plain and obvious meaning of the word injury, they could have easily 
have chosen to apply this section only to serious physical injury. 
The Michigan Legislature recognized the distinction between actual damages and losses in the 
remedies provisions of Michigan's Whistleblower Protection Act as follows: 
15.364 Court judgment; order; remedies; awarding costs of litigation. 
Sec. 4. A court, in rendering ajudgment in an action brought pursuant to this act, shall order, 
as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement ofthe employee, the payment of back wages, 
full reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination 
of these remedies. A court may also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs of 
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litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, ifthe court determines that the 
award is appropriate. 
Thus, in Michigan, the court may consider an award of "actual damages" in addition to the payment 
of back wages. When Idaho Code Sections 6-2105 and 6-2106 are read together, the same result should 
be derived as that established in the above Michigan statute. 
To the extent that §6-2106 doesn't specifically list compensation for pain and suffering as a remedy, 
it does list, "other remuneration". The online Merriam-Webster definition of "remuneration" is " 
recompense, pay." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remuneration. Another online 
definition of "remuneration" is "a payment or reward for goods or services or for losses sustained or 
inconvenience caused. http://www.bing.comJDictionary/Search?q=define+remuneration. 
Pain and suffering damages falls within the plain meaning of both §6-2105 and 6-2106. The court 
abused its discretion by too narrowly construing the language ofthese sections. It would seem illogical 
for the Legislature, in its enactment ofthe Whistleblower Act, to fail to provide sufficient remedies to 
make the employee whole. Pain and suffering remedies would serve to more justly compensate the 
whistleblower, as well as add to the deterrent against unlawful terminations. 
The court should have allowed testimony regarding the pain and suffering that Van experienced. 
By excluding such testimony, the court denied Van his right of presenting the entirety of his case. It 
is likely that if Van had been able to present testimony regarding his pain and suffering, the jury would 
have better understood the wrenching dilemmas that Van was placed in by engaging in protected 
activity and a different outcome would have resulted. 
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VII. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE EMPLOYER'S PROVOCATION OF THE EMPLOYEE WHILE 
REPORTING PROTECTED ACTIVITY 
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the court's non-usage of Plaintiff's instructions regarding 
provocation, arguing that the case law has developed in other jurisdictions to allow the jury to be 
instructed as to whether or not the response that Van gave to suspected violations was appropriate 
based on provocation or based on whatthe employer was doing. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1267, 11. 11-20. Counsel 
requested the following instructions: 
Courts may allow certain indiscretion by employees who are wrongfully terminated. 
* * * 
Expressions of anger by an employee can be justified while he/she is pursuing complaints 
against the employer or suspected or actual violations of laws, rules and regulation. 
* * * 
As long as an employee's indiscretions are not major, it is immaterial that the employee's 
conduct would constitute a sufficient reason for discharge if the actual reason for discharge is 
the employee's participation in concerted protected activity. 
* * * 
It would be ironic ifnot absurd, to hold that one loses the protection ofan anti-discrimination 
statute if one gets visibly or audibly upset about discriminatory conduct. 
* * * 
An employer cannot provoke an employer to a point where he commits an indiscretion in 
connection with the pursuit of his complaints and then rely on this to terminate his 
employment. 
* * * 
The leeway to be granted to an employee engaging in protected activity is greater when the 
employee's behavior takes place in response to the employer's wrongful provocation. Tr. Vol. 
2, p. 1269,11. 9-25, p. 1270,11.1-24. Precision Window Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 963 F.2d 1105 (8th 
Cir. 1992), Evans v. Miami Valley Hospital and CJ Systems Aviation Group, Inc., 2006-AlR-
00022(31 August 2007), Trustees of Boston Universityv.NL.R.B. 548F.2d391 (lstCir.1977), 
HughH Wilson Corp. vNLRB,414F.2d 1345, 1356 (3rd Cir. 1969),Hertzv. LuzenacAmerica, 
Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1022 (10th Cir. 2004), Formella University v. Us. Department of Labor, 
09-2296 (FED7), NLRB v. M &B Headware Co., 349 F.ed 170, 174 (4th Cir. 1965). 
Plaintiff's counsel indicated that the above instructions should be utilized on the grounds that Van's 
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Policy letter 12 was provoked by his employer's actions in the August 21,2003 meeting, Portneufs 
actions provoked Van to write his March 28,2005 letter to crew members, and Portneufs actions 
provoked Van during the April pt meeting. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1271,11.3-25, p. 1272,11.1-21. The court 
simply concluded, "I'm going to note your objection to not having those included, but I don't believe 
that the evidence supports the use of those instructions." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1283,11. 12-14. 
The evidence in the record absolutely supported the use of the instructions. Portneufutilizes all of 
the above incidents and instances to support its basis for termination. And yet, these scenarios involved 
Van responding to provocations by Portneuf. Van wrote Policy Letter 12 because Alzola kept saying 
in the August 2003 meeting that Fergie didn't do anything wrong and that the mechanics couldn't tell 
the pilots if they were going to fly or not. Van wrote the March 28, 2005 letter to crew members 
because Humphrey had stopped him short from addressing his safety/regulation concerns on March 24. 
He understood that another meeting was going to be held but Humphrey quickly capsized that notion. 
Van was trying resolve concerns in April 1, 2005 meeting after provocation by Neilsen which had 
resulted from improperly disclosed emails pertaining to snow and ice matters. Finally, Van was 
certainly had reason to be provoked in the April 1 meeting by the condescending responses given by 
Neilsen and the attitudes shown by the others in attendance. 
Based on the evidence in the record, Van was certainly entitled leeway in acting the way he did 
given what he had to deal with. Based upon the above case law, other jurisdictions rightfully give the 
whistle blower the benefit of the doubt in this regard. The court's act of not allowing the jury to consider 
the issue of provocation was an abuse of discretion and was not supported by the evidence. Had the 
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jury been able to give leeway to Van with regard to his reactions, Portneuf's basis for tennination would 
certainly have been proven less viable and the verdict would likely have turned out in favor of Van 
VIII. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
On June 29, 2011, the court entered judgment in favor of Defendant in the amount of$54,860.46. 
The court awarded $12,063.72 in costs as a matter of right, discretionary costs for expert witness fees 
in the amount of$4,603.92, and $38,192.82 incurred in the appeal of the initial action. R. Vol. III, pp. 
559, 563 and 568. R. Vol. III, p. 570. As will be discussed below, the court acted far outside the 
bounds of its discretion in awarding these amounts to Portneuf. 
In its June 29 Memorandum Decision and Order, the court stated: 
This Court has carefully reviewed the Defendant's requests for costs as a matter of right 
pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(I)(C) and has detennined the claimed costs are all reasonable and of 
the type included in that rule. This Court has also found Portneuf Medical Center to be the 
prevailing party in this matter and therefore entitled to an award of costs pursuant to the 
governing statutes and the rules of civil procedure. (Emphasis added) R. Vol. III, pp. 558-559. 
The Court disregarded Plaintiffs arguments that the controlling statute for cost awards was under 
the Whistleblower Act. R. Vol. III, p. 560. 
The right to recover costs is statutory, and no cost can be granted without statutory authorization. 
Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 102 Idaho 744, 750 639 P.2d 442,448 (1981) 
See also Agrodyne, Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342, 348 757 P.2d 205, 211 (Ct. App. 1988)(Pet. 
Rehearing denied); Odziemek v. Weseiy,102 Idaho 582, 585, 634 P.2d 623, 626, (1981)(1. Bistline 
dissenting). The only statute cited by Portneufin support of its request for costs was I.C. § 12-121. R. 
Vol. II, p. 346. However, §12-121 only pertains to attorney fees. 
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The court found that "Idaho Code Section 12-101 provides that "[ c ]osts shall be awarded by the 
court in a civil trial or proceeding to the parties in a manner and in the amount provided for by the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." R, Vol. III, p. 556. Contrary to the court's conclusions, § 12-101does 
not provide statutory authorization for costs, but actually establishes that when costs are to be awarded, 
they are to be awarded in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Even if § 12-101 were found to authorize an award in this instance, § 12-101 does not control over 
the more specific statute, I.C. §6-2107. Fairfax v. Ramirez, 133 idaho 72, 79, 982 P.2d 375, 382 (Ct. 
App. 1999)("Where two statutory provisions appear to apply to the grant of attorney fees, the specific 
controls over the general." 
The only statutory authority that is applicable to an award of costs in Van's whistleblower case is 
I.e. §6-2107, which provides as follows: 
A court may also order that reasonable attorneys fees and court costs be awarded to an 
employer if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this chapter is 
without basis in law or in fact (emphasis added). 
Portneuf is foreclosed from obtaining costs under I.C. §6-2107 for two reasons. First, it never 
sought costs under I.e. §6-2107. Second, even ifPortneufwere to have asked for costs under the 
statute, there are absolutely no grounds for it to claim that Van's whistleblower claims are without basis 
in law or fact. The court's denial ofPortneuf's Motion for Directed Verdict serves as ample evidence 
that Van's action has basis in law and fact. For these reasons, neither costs as a matter of right or 
discretionary costs should have been awarded. The court clearly abused its discretion. 
In its initial decision, this Court stated, "[t]he district court may award costs and fees incurred with 
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respect to the appeal to the party that prevails on remand." (Emphasis added). Van, 147 Idaho at 562, 
212 P.3d at 992. The trial court's award of attorney fees incurred in the appeal was also an abuse of 
discretion. Given the applicable case law, the court is prohibited from awarding any fees on appeal. 
Attorney fees will not be awarded without citation to an applicable statutory basis for the award. 
PHH Mortgage Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 641, 200 P.3d 1180, 1190 (2009) (Idaho 
follows the "American Rule" of attorney fees, which requires a party requesting attorney fees on appeal 
to cite either statutory or contractual authority in support); McGee v. JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328,337 
17 P .3d 281 (2000)( attorney fees will not be awarded on appeal when no statutory authority has been 
cited in support ofthe request); Idaho Dept. of Correction v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 680, 684, 8 P.3d 675, 
679 (Idaho App. 2000) (application ofI.C. § 12-117 excludes the Department of Correction, request for 
fees is denied as no other statutory basis for request for attorney fees on appeal is cited). 
Portneuf did not seek attorney fees on appeal based on any statutory basis other than I.e. §12-121. 
R. Vol. III, pp. 517, 566. Furthermore, the court did not cite any statutory basis for awarding fees on 
appeal other than quote Portneuf's request. R. Vol. III, pp. 566-567. 
An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is not a matter of right and is appropriate only when 
the Court, in its discretion, "is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. 
Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524,20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001) citing Owner-Operator Ind. 
Drivers Assoc. v. Idaho Public Uti!. Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 401, 408, 871 P.2d 818, 825 (1994). See also 
Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999; and Management 
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Catalystsv. Turbo WestCorpac,Inc., 119 Idaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d487,491 (1991) (emphasis added). 
Through the court's denial of Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, the trial court undeniably 
found that there were triable issues of fact. Based on the language of the case law cited above, no 
attorney fees can be awarded by this Court on appeal under § 12-121. Additionally, this Court's initial 
decision gave no indication that the elements for an award of fees under § 12-121 could be met. 
Moreover, I.C. §12-121 is not even the appropriate basis for considering fees on Van's 
whistleblower claims because the controlling statute for an award of fees on Van's whistleblower 
claims is I.C. §6-2107. Given thatPortneuf did not ask for fees under I.C. §6-2107, the court could not 
have awarded fees on appeal under this statute. The court simply abused its discretion by awarding fees 
to the prevailing party without any statutory basis whatsoever. 
X. 
MARK VAN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
As indicated earlier, §6-2106 of the Whistleblower Act provides for attorney fees as follows: 
A court, in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may order any or all of the 
following: 
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. 
The jury's decision in this matter was not based on substantial and competent evidence and was 
contrary to applicable whistle blower law. The district court made substantial and reversible errors 
pertaining to the admission of evidence. The district court committed reversible error by ruling that 
admissions by party opponents were inadmissible hearsay. The district court committed reversible error 
by allowing evidence pertaining to emails that had were written four years after Van's termination and 
had nothing to do with his termination. The district court abused it's discretion in refusing to instruct 
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the jury on provocation. The district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. 
Van should prevail on appeal and should be awarded appeal fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §6-2106. 
XI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mark Van respectfully requests that his appeal from the trial court's March 
17,2011 Judgment and from the Memorandum Decision and Order and Judgment entered June 29, 
2011, be granted and that the Court reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2013. 
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